

## Summary of the 2024 Baku Climate Change Conference: 11-22 November 2024

After two difficult weeks of negotiations, the Baku Climate Change Conference delivered a milestone agreement that will inform climate action for years to come: parties set a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance. The NCQG decision calls on all actors to work together to scale up financing to developing countries for climate action from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. It sets a goal of: at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing countries' climate action from a wide variety of sources—public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources—and with developed countries taking the lead. Developing countries are encouraged to make contributions on a voluntary basis.

In the context of the NCQG, parties further agreed to pursue efforts to at least triple annual outflows from the key climate funds from 2022 levels by 2030 at the latest. The decision also acknowledges the need for public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance, particularly for adaptation and responding to loss and damage, especially for those most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and with significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS).

Negotiations toward the definition of this new goal, which is an extension of the USD 100 billion per year by 2020 goal, were tense. Developed countries urged expanding the contributor base to include other parties in a position to contribute. Developing countries called for a higher quantum, with some calling for specific targets on the provision of public finance and the mobilization of finance, and LDCs and SIDS calling for minimum allocation floors for their groups.

Another major outcome was the operationalization of the market-based cooperative implementation of the Paris Agreement (Articles 6.2 and 6.4). Parties had been negotiating the modalities for setting up the Agreement's carbon markets for many years, with the aim to ensure that activities thereunder effectively deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions and comply with agreed-upon environmental safeguards, and monitoring and reporting provisions. The expectation is that this will support progress toward the goals of the Paris Agreement in a cost-efficient manner.

Parties also: extended the work programme on gender; provided further guidance on defining indicators for assessing progress toward the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA); adopted arrangements

with the new Loss and Damage Fund; and extended the mandate of the working group facilitating the implementation of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform.

However, parties could not reach agreement on a range of issues, including:

- the dialogue on the implementation of the outcomes of the Global Stocktake (GST);
- the just transition work programme;
- review of the progress, effectiveness, and performance of the Adaptation Committee;
- second review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance;

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- seventh review of the Financial Mechanism;
- linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism;
- the report on the annual dialogue on the GST informing NDC preparation; and
- procedural and logistical elements of the overall GST process.

Disagreement on some issues related to debates over the respective roles of the governing bodies of the Convention and the Paris Agreement. Disagreement on other issues centered on whether and how to take forward the GST outcomes, especially with regard to energy transition. Many groups and countries expressed their disappointment over the fact that no agreement was found in Baku, especially considering the importance of the next round of NDCs, to be submitted in 2025, to avoid overshooting the 1.5°C goal.

The Baku Climate Change Conference convened from 11-22 November 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan. The conference consisted of the 29th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 19th meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 19), the 6th meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 6), and the 61st sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 61) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 61).

In total, 66,778 people were registered for on-site attendance, including 33,158 delegates from parties, 13,386 observers, 3,575 members of the media, and 14,473 support and Secretariat staff. Of the observers, 1,880 were guests of the host country, Azerbaijan. Another 3,975 people, comprising 157 delegates from parties and 3,818 observers, registered for online participation.

### **A Brief History of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement**

The international political response to climate change began with the 1992 adoption of the UNFCCC, which sets out the basic legal framework and principles for international climate change cooperation with the aim of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Convention, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, has 197 parties.

To boost the effectiveness of the UNFCCC, parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. It commits industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market economy to achieve quantified emission reduction targets for a basket of six GHGs. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and has 192 parties. Its first commitment period took place from 2008 to 2012 followed by the second commitment period, 2013-2020.

In December 2015, parties adopted the Paris Agreement. The Agreement aims to limit the global average temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. It also aims to increase parties’ ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and make financial flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. Each party shall communicate, at five-year intervals, successively more ambitious NDCs. As later decided in 2021 in Glasgow, each NDC will last ten years, but will be updated every five years. The Agreement further sets out an Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) for national reporting by all parties.

Collective progress toward implementing the Agreement is to be reviewed every five years through a GST. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016 and has 193 parties.

### **Recent Highlights**

**Katowice:** The Katowice Climate Change Conference convened from 2-14 December 2018 in Poland. Parties adopted decisions to facilitate the interpretation and implementation of the Paris Agreement with regard to the mitigation section of NDCs, adaptation communications, ETF, GST, and financial transparency, among others. Work on cooperative implementation, under Article 6 of the Agreement, was not concluded, and parties agreed to conclude this work in 2019. The COP was unable to agree on whether to “welcome” or “note” the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Special Report on 1.5°C of Global Warming.

**Chile/Madrid:** The Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference convened from 2-13 December 2019 in Spain, under the Presidency of Chile. Delegates established the Santiago Network aimed at catalyzing technical support on loss and damage, and adopted the enhanced five-year Lima Work Programme and its Gender Action Plan (GAP). Parties also adopted three cover decisions under the COP, CMP and CMA. On many issues, notably Article 6 and long-term finance, parties could not reach agreement.

**Glasgow:** The Glasgow Climate Change Conference convened in Scotland from 31 October – 12 November 2021, following the COVID-19 pandemic-related interruption to the annual rhythm. Parties finalized the outstanding Paris Agreement rulebook issues, adopting guidelines, rules, and a work programme on Article 6 and agreeing on the format of reporting under the ETF. Parties adopted a series of three cover decisions that, for the first time, included a reference to phasing down unabated coal power and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. They also established work programmes on the GGA, and on urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade; created a dialogue on loss and damage funding; established a process toward defining a new collective quantified goal on climate finance; and launched an annual dialogue on ocean-based climate action.

**Sharm El-Sheikh:** The Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Change Conference convened in Egypt from 6-20 November 2022. For the first time, parties recognized the need for finance to respond to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and established a fund and funding arrangements, with details to be worked out in 2023. Key elements in the package leading to this agreement were the operationalization of the mitigation work programme (MWP) and initiating the development of a GGA framework. Parties also adopted two cover decisions, which among others: established a work programme on just transition to discuss pathways to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement; and launched a dialogue to enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement (finance flow consistency), and its complementarity with Article 9 (climate finance).

**Dubai:** The United Arab Emirates Climate Change Conference convened in Dubai from 30 November – 11 December 2023. The major outcome was the adoption of a decision concluding the first GST under the Paris Agreement. It encourages parties to ensure their next NDCs are 1.5°C-aligned and have ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all GHGs, sectors, and categories. Among other things, the decision also calls on parties to contribute, in a nationally-determined manner, to global efforts on: tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by

2030; and transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science.

The conference started on a high note, with the adoption of a decision operationalizing the loss and damage fund during the opening plenary. Parties also adopted the GGA framework, including thematic and dimensional targets, agreed on a host for the Santiago Network, operationalized the just transition work programme; and decided to convene dialogues on mountains and on children at the Subsidiary Bodies meetings in June 2024.

### Report of the Meetings

The Baku Climate Change Conference opened on Monday, [11 November](#). COP 28 President Sultan Al Jaber opened the meeting, emphasizing the need to “unite, act, and deliver.” He called on all parties who are able, to contribute to the capitalization of the Loss and Damage Fund, and urged delivering a robust new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance.

COP 29 President Mukhtar Babayev emphasized that COP 29 is an “unmissable moment” and urged delivering a fair and ambitious NCQG, which sends a strong signal to financial markets.

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell stressed that “climate finance is not charity,” but is in the self-interest of all parties: “If two-thirds of the world’s nations cannot afford to cut emissions, every nation pays the price.”

As the adoption of the meeting agendas was delayed, parties and stakeholder groups presented opening statements only on Wednesday, [13 November](#). Heads of State and Government delivered high-level statements on Tuesday, [12 November](#), and Wednesday, [13 November](#), and Ministers delivered high-level statements on Wednesday, [20 November](#).

During the first week, negotiations were largely conducted under the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs). The closing plenary of the SBs took place on Saturday, [16 November](#), during which parties adopted a number of conclusions and forwarded draft texts to the governing bodies for further consideration in the second week. On several issues, parties could not reach agreement and therefore the SBs could not forward any text to serve as a basis for further discussions. On several of those issues, agreement was nevertheless found under the governing bodies.

### Procedural Matters

**Rules of procedure:** Parties agreed to apply the draft rules of procedure ([FCCC/CP/1996/2](#)), except draft rule 42 on voting. Presidency-led consultations did not lead to agreement on the adoption of the rules of procedure.

**Adoption of the agendas:** During the opening plenary on Monday, [11 November](#), parties debated the meeting agendas. They eventually adopted the agendas of the [COP](#), [CMP](#), [CMA](#), [SBI](#), and [SBSTA](#), without the agenda items suggested for inclusion by parties and with the understanding that the Presidency would conduct consultations on the way forward regarding: mountains; the special needs and circumstances of Africa; the seventh review of the Financial Mechanism; climate-related trade-restrictive unilateral measures; the governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism on loss and damage (WIM); and decision making under the UNFCCC. No consensus was reached on these issues.

**Election of officers:** During the closing plenary, parties elected Adonia Ayebare (Uganda) as the new SBSTA Chair and Julia Gardiner (Australia) as the new SBI Chair.

**Dates and venues of future sessions:** The matter was discussed in Presidency consultations. During the closing plenary, parties heard an intervention from Brazil, as the incoming Presidency of the governing body sessions in 2025. Marina Silva, Minister of the Environment and Climate Change, Brazil, noted that COP 28 was a “COP of alignment” on what we need to undertake to avoid overshooting the 1.5°C goal, and underscored that COP 29 needs to deliver alignment on the means of implementation necessary to fulfill this mission. Highlighting Indigenous women’s practice of “weaving together,” she called for revitalizing solidarity, responsibility, and mutual trust, and underscored the central goal for COP 30 to have in place sufficiently ambitious NDCs to reach the 1.5°C goal.

**Final Outcomes:** In its decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.9](#)), the COP:

- requests the Executive Secretary to conclude a Host Country Agreement with Brazil;
- invites parties from the Western European and Others Group to come forward with offers to host COP 31, CMP 21, and CMA 8, recalling that the SBI urged the region to present an offer no later than the 62nd session of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) in June 2025;
- invites parties from the African States to come forward with offers to host COP 32, CMP 22, and CMA 9 (November 2026); and
- requests SBI 62 to consider the issue of the hosts for the governing body sessions in 2026 and 2027, and to recommend draft decisions for adoption by the respective bodies in 2025.

**Admission of observers:** The COP agreed to admit all listed observers and took note of organizations that changed their names ([FCCC/CP/2024/2](#)).

**Report on Credentials:** The COP, CMP, and CMA adopted the report ([FCCC/CP/2024/10–FCCC/KP/CMP/2024/6–FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/16](#)).

**Report of the Subsidiary Bodies:** The Co-Chairs of the 2024 Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue reported on the outcomes of the dialogue convened during SB 60 and highlighted the recommendation for parties to include ocean-based mitigation and adaptation action in their NDCs. The COP, CMP, and CMA took note of the reports of SBSTA 60 ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/7](#) and [Add.1](#)), SBSTA 61 ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.13](#)), SBI 60 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/13](#), [Add.1](#) and [Add.2](#)), and SBI 61 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.15](#)).

### Finance

**New collective quantified goal:** COP 21 decided that, prior to 2025, the CMA shall set an NCQG from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries. CMA 3 set out the arrangements for work on setting the NCQG, including establishing an *ad hoc* work programme for 2022–2024, convening high-level ministerial dialogues and taking stock of progress, and providing further guidance on the *ad hoc* work programme for CMA 4, 5, and 6.

Discussions at CMA 6 were informed by: the report of the 2024 high-level ministerial dialogue ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/12](#)) and the report from the *ad hoc* work programme’s Co-Chairs ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/9](#) and [Add.1](#)), which included a proposed “substantive framework” for a draft negotiating text.

During the first week, work was taken up in a contact group, co-chaired by Fiona Gilbert (Australia) and Zaheer Fakir (UAE), which met on [12](#), [13](#), [14](#), [15](#), and [16](#) November. During the second week, ministerial consultations co-facilitated by Yasmine Fouad (Egypt)



and Chris Bowen (Australia) convened, focusing on the goal's structure, quantum, and contributor base.

Work in the contact group centered on transparency arrangements to track finance provided and mobilized, with many in favor of using the ETF for this purpose. There was considerable debate on whether, and how, to capture voluntary South-South finance contributions, as well as on access arrangements to remove barriers to developing countries' ability to secure climate finance.

At the political level, the three main questions on structure, quantum, and contributor base remained unresolved until the final hours. On structure, developed countries were united in their demands for a "core" of publicly provided and mobilized finance, surrounded by a "layer" for investment. Developing countries widely rejected the investment layer, citing inequities in investment because of high costs of capital, diseconomies of scale, credit ratings, and other impediments that the UNFCCC may be unable to resolve.

On the quantum, the G-77/CHINA remained united in calls for USD 1.3 trillion of provided and mobilized finance by 2030. Unity broke down on the question of allocation floors. The ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) and the LDCs demanded a floor of USD 39 billion for SIDS and USD 220 billion for LDCs. The INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) called for regional allocation floors. Developed countries did not provide a quantum that was included in any draft text, although figures of USD 200-300 billion were floated informally.

On the contributor base, developed countries demanded expansion to other countries in a position to provide climate finance. CHINA and others characterized the voluntary provision of South-South climate finance as "fundamentally different." The GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA (G-77/CHINA) underscored developed countries' obligations to provide finance to developing countries.

During the closing plenary, the CMA adopted its decision, setting a new USD 300 billion goal. CUBA regretted developed countries' lack of commitment and said that the decision reinforces "resource colonialism." He stressed that USD 300 billion is not sufficient to implement ambitious NDCs, and suggested that adjusted for inflation, it is less than the previous USD 100 billion goal.

INDIA objected to the adoption of the decision, calling it an "unfortunate incident" that was not inclusive because they informed the Presidency and Secretariat that they wanted to make a statement before its adoption. She underscored that developed countries should advance emission cuts, and provide means of implementation (MoI) to enable developing countries to take action. She rejected the goal in its form, stressing it will affect implementation, adaptation, mitigation, resilience, and growth of developing countries. She considered the encouragement of voluntary contributions from developing countries "highly problematic."

President Babayev took note of the statement and said it will be recorded in the report.

BOLIVIA supported India and rejected the adoption of the decision. He lamented that developed countries expand fossil fuel production while demanding developing countries undertake ambitious emissions targets. President Babayev said the statement would be reflected in the meeting report.

NIGERIA characterized the USD 300 billion goal as an "insult" that did not represent developed countries "taking the lead." She stressed that parties should decide whether to accept the decision and that their country did not. President Babayev said the statement would be noted in the report.

The LDCs deplored the lack of ambition in light of developing countries' needs, highlighting that needs are in the trillions but then only sets out a goal in the billions. They lamented the exclusion of loss and damage, and "missing" minimum allocation floors for LDCs and SIDS.

Saying they leave with a "heavy heart and mixed feelings," PAKISTAN identified critical gaps in the overall package, particularly in the NCQG decision. They lamented that the climate crisis is becoming a debt crisis as developing countries are forced to resort to loans, which widens global inequalities.

The EU called COP 29 the beginning of a new era of climate finance by putting more money on the table, improving access, boosting adaptation funding, enlarging the contributor base voluntarily, and expanding the role of multilateral development banks to raise more private investment.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.22](#)), the CMA, *inter alia*:

- affirms the NCQG is aimed at contributing to accelerating achievement of Paris Agreement Article 2 on holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels; and making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development;
- reaffirms the outcomes of the first GST and stresses the urgency of enhancing ambition and action in this critical decade to address the gaps in the implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement;
- notes the findings of the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report that if climate goals are to be achieved, both adaptation and mitigation financing need to be increased manyfold and there is sufficient global capital to close the global investment gap and there are barriers to redirecting capital to climate action, and governments, through public funding and clear signals to investors, are key in reducing these barriers;
- decides that the NCQG will contribute to increasing and accelerating ambition and reflect the evolving needs and priorities of developing countries, especially those particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the LDCs and SIDS;
- reiterates the importance of reforming the multilateral financial architecture and underscores the need to remove barriers and address disenablers faced by developing countries in financing climate action, including high costs of capital, limited fiscal space, unsustainable debt levels, high transaction costs, and conditionalities for accessing climate finance;
- calls on all actors to work together to enable the scaling up of finance from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035;
- reaffirms Article 9 of the Paris Agreement (finance) and decides to set a goal, in extension of the USD 100 goal, with developed countries taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing countries' climate action: from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources; in the context of meaningful and ambitious mitigation and adaptation action, and transparency in implementation; recognizing the voluntary intention of parties to count all climate-related outflows from and climate-related finance mobilized by multilateral development banks toward achievement of the goal;

- encourages developing countries to make contributions, including through South–South cooperation, on a voluntary basis, affirming this does not affect any party’s development or recipient status;
- acknowledges the need for public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance, particularly for adaptation and responding to loss and damage in developing countries, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as LDCs and SIDS;
- decides to pursue efforts to at least triple annual outflows from the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, the Adaptation Fund, the LDC Fund, and the Special Climate Change Fund from 2022 levels by 2030 at the latest with a view to significantly scaling up the share of finance delivered through them;
- recognizes: the need to dramatically scale up adaptation finance; the need for urgent and enhanced action and support for averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage; and the importance of continued efforts to support just transitions across all sectors and thematic areas, and cross-cutting efforts, including transparency, readiness, capacity building, and technology development and transfer;
- calls on parties to enhance their enabling environments, in a nationally determined manner, with a view to increasing climate financing;
- decides to launch, under the guidance of the CMA 6 and CMA 7 Presidencies, in consultation with parties, the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T” aimed at scaling up climate finance to developing countries to support low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development pathways, and implement NDCs and national adaptation plans (NAPs), including through grants, concessional and non-debt-creating instruments, and measures to create fiscal space; and requests the Presidencies to produce a report summarizing the work for CMA 7 (November 2025);
- recalls that developed countries shall, and other parties are encouraged to, provide transparent and consistent information on support for developing countries provided and mobilized biennially in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support (Paris Agreement, Article 9.7) and that developed countries shall, and other parties are encouraged to, provide information in accordance with the modalities, procedures, and guidelines contained in Chapter V of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1;
- requests the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) to prepare a report biennially, commencing in 2028, on collective progress toward all elements of the decision, for consideration by the CMA, and invites the SCF to consider in its report the regional balance in efforts to increase finance, including both qualitative and quantitative considerations, and disaggregated information related to LDCs and SIDS;
- invites submissions on financial support provided and mobilized in 2025 and 2026 by 30 June 2028, and the provision of relevant subsequent information on a biennial basis thereafter, to provide a full overview of aggregate financial support provided and to inform the GST;
- decides to undertake a special assessment of access to climate finance at CMA 12 (2030) with a view to assessing progress on access and identifying further opportunities for enhancing it; and
- decides to periodically take stock of the implementation of the decision as part of the GST and to initiate deliberations on the way forward prior to 2035, including through a review of the decision in 2030.

**Long-term finance:** The long-term finance work programme was established in 2011 to consider arrangements for pre-2020 finance. The mandate was extended in 2016 to consider post-2020 finance. Under this COP item, parties reviewed the Needs-based Finance project ([FCCC/CP/2024/7](#)) and the second report on progress toward achieving the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year ([FCCC/CP/2024/6/Add.3–FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/8/Add.3](#)). Informal consultations, co-facilitated by Madeleine Diouf (Senegal) and Ouafae Salmi (Belgium), met on [12](#), [18](#), and [21](#) November. The draft decision was sent to the Presidency for further discussions.

Views diverged sharply on whether developed countries had met the USD 100 billion finance goal in 2022. Developed countries urged recognition that they had, pointing to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates cited in the SCF’s progress report. Many developing countries pointed to Oxfam’s much lower estimates, which developed countries said did not include the full scope of climate finance sources. LDCs rejected the inclusion of “innovative sources.” Developing countries called for a common definition of climate finance, opposed by developed countries.

The ARAB GROUP and LIKE-MINDED GROUP OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs) proposed a placeholder in the decision for the NCQG, which would allow the long-term finance work programme to track progress toward the NCQG. Developed countries opposed this, citing the transparency arrangements discussed as part of the NCQG.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.14](#)), the COP, *inter alia*:

- recalls the goal of mobilizing USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to address the climate finance need of developing countries, and the goal’s extension through 2025; and
- notes the second report of the SCF on progress toward achieving this goal and the findings contained therein.

**Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance:** Established in 2010, the SCF provides recommendations related to a wide range of issues, including draft guidance to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism; maintaining the coherence and coordination of the operating entities; providing expert input into the review of the Financial Mechanism; and preparing a biennial overview of climate finance flows. This item falls under the COP and the CMA, which had several inputs to consider: the SCF report ([FCCC/CP/2024/6–FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/8](#)); the Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows ([Add.1](#)); the second needs determination report ([Add.2](#)); the report on common practices regarding climate finance definitions ([Add.4](#)); and summary of the 2024 SCF Forum on accelerating climate action and resilience through gender mainstreaming ([Add.5](#)).

Clara Schultz (Sweden) and Ali Waqas (Pakistan) co-chaired the contact groups under the COP and CMA, which met on [12](#), [13](#), and [18](#) November. The issue was then referred to the Presidency for further consultations. Contact group discussions debated which governing body should adopt the decision, the operational definition of climate finance, how to refer to the 2024 SCF Forum report, and future mandates of the SCF, among others.

On governing bodies, the ARAB GROUP, LMDCs, and AFRICAN GROUP called for a COP decision only. The EU, AUSTRALIA, and CANADA called for both the COP and CMA to address the issue.

Many developed countries welcomed the SCF’s efforts to revise its operational definition of climate finance. The LDCs said it failed to address the continued problems with various definitions,

reporting, and accounting methods. GRUPO SUR called for the definition to specify that climate finance is provided to developing countries. The US observed the report provided no recommendations for parties and, with AUSTRALIA, CANADA, and other developed countries, did not see a need for further work on this issue as demanded by the AFRICAN GROUP, the LDCs, AOSIS, and other developing countries.

Views diverged on the need to reference substantive outputs of the SCF Forum related to gender and women in all their diversity. On future work, developed countries noted the SCF's large workload and called for no future mandates, which most developing countries opposed.

**Final Outcomes:** In its decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.5](#)), the COP:

- notes the importance of allocating time for consideration of the SCF's work;
- notes the SCF's update to its operational definition of climate finance and reaffirms the SCF will continue its ongoing technical work on operational definitions of climate finance;
- notes the continued importance of promoting gender-responsive climate action, including in the context of climate finance, and highlights the relevance of improving data and information on the gender-responsiveness of climate finance; and
- notes, and invites relevant stakeholders to make use of, information in the second needs determination report in prioritizing the developing countries and regions that are proportionally underrepresented.

In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.11](#)), the CMA, among others, notes the mapping of available information relevant to Paris Agreement Article 2.1(c) and encourages parties to continue constructive engagement on making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG-emissions and climate-resilient development.

**Second Review of the Functions of the SCF:** The SBI first took up this item and informal consultations were co-facilitated by Clara Schultz (Sweden) and Ali Waqas (Pakistan) on [15 November](#). Parties were reluctant to engage in substance until there was clarity on whether there would be a decision only under the COP or under both the COP and CMA.

**Final Outcome:** In its closing plenary, the SBI agreed to continue its consideration of this matter at SBI 63.

**Report of, and guidance to, the Green Climate Fund (GCF):**

The GCF is an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism. The GCF reports to, and is guided by, the COP. It also serves the Paris Agreement. Under the COP and CMA, parties considered the GCF's report ([FCCC/CP/2024/3, Add.1](#)) and draft guidance from the SCF ([FCCC/CP/2024/6/Add.6–FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/8/Add.6](#)). David Kaluba (Zambia) and Pierre Marc (France) co-chaired the COP and CMA contact groups, which met on [18](#) and [21](#) November, among others.

Parties debated how to avoid “micromanaging” the GCF while providing guidance. Several developed countries called for a reference to the Multilateral Climate Funds' Action Plan on Enhancing Complementarity and Coherence, opposed by the ARAB GROUP, which noted the GCF has not approved this plan. The EU, the US and other developed countries urged a move toward providing guidance biennially, opposed by GRUPO SUR, INDIA, and other developing countries.

Parties discussed how to request the GCF to enhance access and refer to Indigenous Peoples. There was also debate about how to refer to countries experiencing conflict. Ultimately the phrase “national shocks” was used. AILAC, supported by many, requested

several additions to strengthen the GCF's relationship with the Technology Mechanism, especially the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). In the CMA decision, they also called for a placeholder on the NCQG, opposed by developed countries. The Presidency took up further consultations.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.10](#)), the COP modifies its arrangements with the GCF so the COP and CMA provide guidance to the GCF annually until COP 31 and CMA 8, respectively, and biennially thereafter, and also at sessions held in the year immediately preceding the initiation of discussions on new replenishments. The COP confirms guidance may be provided outside the biennial cycle upon request by a party. The COP also notes the vision announced by the GCF's Executive Director for the Fund to be able to efficiently manage USD 50 billion in capital by 2030, and encourages the GCF to continue collaborating with the CTCN to enhance access to technology for developing countries, maximize impact, and strengthen coherence.

The COP requests the GCF Board to:

- continue to streamline and simplify access by reducing processing time for funding proposals in line with the Strategic Plan 2024-2027;
- continue considering ways to better serve regions in a geographically balanced manner, including by exploring regional presence in all developing country regions in line with the GCF's Governing Instrument;
- consider taking measures to ensure the monitoring and accountability requirements for procedures after accreditation are fit for purpose and take into account the capacity constraints of direct access entities;
- strengthen monitoring and reporting of disbursements for, and impacts arising from, inter alia, multi-country activities on a per-country basis in a manner consistent with the integrated results management framework; and
- include information in its annual report on the steps it has taken to implement this guidance.

The COP further urges the Board to:

- continue strengthening efforts to maintain a balance between funding for mitigation and adaptation;
- adopt an updated GAP for the second replenishment and to actively contribute to the implementation of activities under the UNFCCC GAP; and
- continue incorporating into its decision making, consideration of people and communities on the front line of climate change, including Indigenous Peoples and local communities, in line with GCF policies.

In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.17](#)), the CMA, among others, confirms that guidance may be provided, for transmission by the COP, biennially in accordance with the modified arrangements outlined in [FCCC/CP/2024/L.10](#), upon request by a party, as well as at each session of the CMA preceding the final year of each replenishment.

**Report of, and guidance to, the Global Environment Facility (GEF):** The GEF is an operating entity of the UNFCCC's Financial Mechanism. Under the COP and CMA, parties considered the GEF's report ([FCCC/CP/2024/8, Add.1](#)) and draft guidance from the SCF ([FCCC/CP/2024/6/Add.6–FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/8/Add.7](#)). David Kaluba (Zambia) and Pierre Marc (France) co-chaired the COP and CMA contact groups, which met on [18 November](#), among others.

In the contact group, there was considerable attention to the GEF's role in supporting developing countries in developing their Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs). GRUPO SUR, supported



by others, called for long-term support to develop the reporting systems required under the ETF. The AFRICAN GROUP expressed disappointment that the GEF did not provide clear information on its BTR-related enabling activities in its report. Parties also could not agree on whether to refer to the NCQG in this text. The Presidency took up further consultations.

**Final Outcomes:** In its decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.11](#)) the COP, among others:

- requests the GEF, in administering the LDC Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund, to contribute to improving the coherence of and coordination across the funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage;
- urges the GEF to ensure that a broad range of implementing agencies are engaged in its programming to reduce concentration of projects among few implementing agencies and also urges the GEF, in the context of its review of the GEF partnership, to consider national and regional entities in developing countries in all regions, with a focus on underserved regions, when expanding the number of implementing agencies;
- urges the GEF to consider ways of strengthening local capacities and country ownership in its provision of support;
- encourages the GEF to consider opportunities for scaling up programmes focused on technology and innovation;
- requests the GEF, in administering the LDC Fund, to continue facilitating the smooth transition of developing countries graduating from LDC status;
- requests the GEF to continue to support the strengthening of institutional arrangements and capacity building in developing countries to facilitate improved access to and use of GEF resources, facilitating knowledge-sharing and South–South learning on GEF projects and exploring areas for further collaboration; and
- decides to modify the memorandum of understanding between the COP and GEF to ensure guidance from the COP and CMA is provided to the GEF annually until COP 31 and CMA 8, respectively, and biennially thereafter, and also at sessions held in the year immediately preceding the initiation of discussions on new replenishments, and confirms that guidance may be provided outside the biennial cycle at the request of a party.

In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.18](#)), the CMA, among others:

- requests the GEF to include further information in its annual report for 2025 regarding how funds are used to ensure that enabling activities support the sustainability of national reporting systems and enhance institutional capacity in developing countries;
- requests the GEF to consider how it can improve the delivery of support for the Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency and enabling activities to avoid gaps between the project cycles, provide support that is timely, and enhance the sustainability of national reporting systems and workflows necessary for developing countries to meet their requirements under the ETF on a continuous basis; and
- confirms that guidance may be provided biennially, upon request by a party, as well as at each session of the CMA preceding the final year of each replenishment of the GEF.

**Arrangements between the COP, CMA, and the Board of the Loss and Damage Fund:** The Fund was established in 2022 to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in responding to loss and damage. It aims to provide assistance in responding to economic

and non-economic loss and damage associated with climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events. It was operationalized in 2023 as an entity entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC. At the same meeting, parties also invited the World Bank to serve as secretariat host and trustee for the Fund for an interim period of four years.

Parties considered the draft arrangements prepared by the SCF ([FCCC/CP/2024/6/Add.8–FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/8/Add.8](#)) under both the COP and the CMA. Jose Delgado (Austria) and Amena Yauvoli (Fiji) co-chaired the contact group, which met on [13](#) and [15](#) November. AOSIS underlined its understanding that, as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism, the Loss and Damage Fund would be included in the review of the Financial Mechanism.

**Final Outcomes:** In their respective decisions ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.2](#) and [FCCC/CMA/2024/L.3](#)), the COP and the CMA approve the arrangements between the COP, CMA, and the Board, thereby bringing the arrangements into force, and request the Board to report on the implementation of the arrangements in its annual reports to the COP and CMA.

**Report of, and guidance to, the Loss and Damage Fund:** The Loss and Damage Fund is the third operating entity of the Financial Mechanism. Under the COP and CMA, parties considered the report of the Fund ([FCCC/CP/2024/9–FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/13](#) and [Add.1](#)). Jose Delgado (Austria) and Amena Yauvoli (Fiji) co-chaired the contact group, which first met on [13 November](#). During that meeting, parties applauded the work of the Fund Board in its first year. Developed countries preferred welcoming the Board's report and work, without specifying further guidance, while many developing countries identified substantive elements for the decision, particularly on the long-term resource mobilization strategy. Many developing countries urged developed countries to turn their pledges into contribution agreements.

**Final Outcomes:** In their decisions, the COP ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.6](#)) and the CMA ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.12](#)), among others, urge the conversion of pledges as soon as possible, and request the Board to engage with the relevant parties for the timely conversion of pledges to fully executed contribution agreements or arrangements to increase the predictability of resources for the Fund.

**Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund:** The Adaptation Fund was established in 2001 to finance adaptation projects in developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. It is financed, in part, by a share of proceeds from activities under the Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In 2016 parties decided that the Adaptation Fund shall also serve the Paris Agreement. This agenda item was considered in a contact group and informal consultations under the CMP and CMA, on [13](#), [19](#), [20](#) and [21 November](#), co-chaired and co-facilitated by Ralph Bodle (Germany) and Isatou Camara (The Gambia).

One of the key issues was the transition to the Adaptation Fund exclusively serving the Paris Agreement. Regarding work of the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) to transition the Fund, the EU, the ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG), the UK, the US, and CANADA anticipated that shares of proceeds from the Article 6.4 Mechanism will soon be available and called for the Board to amend and adopt the relevant statutory documents. The ARAB GROUP, LMDCs, and AFRICAN GROUP said this work cannot be finalized until the CMP and CMA confirm that shares of proceeds are available, and called for clarity on how those would be made available. The ARAB GROUP and the AFRICAN GROUP opposed any language in the text on transition of the Adaptation Fund from

the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement, while the EIG, EU, UK, and others highlighted this as a priority and supported retaining the relevant paragraphs.

On the paragraphs referencing gender-responsive finance and the 2024 SCF forum on gender-responsive climate finance, the ARAB GROUP, opposed by CANADA, the US, and others, preferred deleting both paragraphs, citing their irrelevance to Adaptation Fund issues. They did, however, express flexibility to retain reference to gender-responsiveness of resources in line with agreed language from [Decision 3/CMP.18](#) (Adaptation Fund matters).

**Final Outcomes:** In their respective decisions, the CMP ([FCCC/KP/CMP/2024/L.1](#)) and CMA ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.10](#)), *inter alia*:

- underscore the urgency of scaling up financial resources, including the provision of voluntary support, that are additional to the share of proceeds levied on certified emission reductions;
- emphasize the importance of continuing to take action to promote the adequacy and predictability of adaptation finance, including through multi-year contributions;
- underscore the need to tailor projects to local contexts, including through initial assessments and consultations with diverse groups in line with the Adaptation Fund guidelines and policies;
- invite the AFB to consider areas for improvement in the context of the gender-responsiveness of the AF's work, taking into account relevant insights, including from the summary report on the 2024 SCF Forum on accelerating climate action and resilience through gender-responsive finance;
- emphasize the need for maintaining continuity in implementing the activities of the AFB during the transition of the Adaptation Fund from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement, including continued access of developing countries to support for adaptation; and
- request SBI 62 to consider the matter of the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and to make recommendations on this matter for consideration by CMP 20 and CMA 7, respectively.

The CMA further:

- stresses the importance of financial contributions to the Adaptation Fund, including in the context of urging developed countries to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation from 2019 levels by 2025;
- recognizes the potential for the share of proceeds from the Article 6.4 mechanism to increase the capitalization of the Adaptation Fund; and
- requests the Adaptation Fund to provide updates on its activities and scope of support in relation to assisting developing countries in their efforts toward the implementation of the GGA Framework.

**Report on doubling adaptation finance:** At COP 26, developed countries pledged to double their adaptation finance contribution by 2025 ([decision 1/CMA.3](#)). The GST outcome further called on developed countries to submit a report on their progress toward achieving this goal. Under the CMA, parties considered the first such report ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/15](#)). Jens Fugl (Denmark) and Maria Luwalhati Tiuseco (Philippines) co-chaired the contact group, which adopted procedural conclusions on [18 November](#).

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.4](#)), the CMA takes note of the efforts undertaken in response to the GST outcome on doubling adaptation finance.

**Dialogue on the scope of Paris Agreement Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9:** Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement sets out the overarching goal of making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development, while Article 9 deals with parties' obligations in relation to climate finance. The relationship between the two provisions has been the subject of debate. In 2022, parties established a dedicated dialogue that holds at least one workshop per year.

The CMA considered the report of the Co-Chairs of the Dialogue ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/11](#)), including in a contact group and informal consultations co-chaired and co-facilitated by Ben Abraham (New Zealand) and Elena Pereira (Honduras), which took place on [12](#), [13](#), and [18 November](#).

All parties appreciated the work of the Dialogue's Co-Chairs but expressed diverging interpretations of what Article 2.1(c) means and its relation to Article 9, in particular with regard to the role of the private sector. AOSIS, supported by CANADA and others, called for future workshops under the Dialogue to be more responsive to the needs of SIDS, noting many of the speakers invited from other organizations did not reflect on these realities. Parties also debated which organizations should be invited to submit their views on the topics to be addressed in future workshops.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.5](#)), the CMA, among others, encourages the Dialogue's Co-Chairs to continue enhancing their efforts to organize and conduct the workshops to be held in 2025 in an inclusive, open, and transparent manner, including by ensuring participatory representativeness, facilitating the engagement of parties and non-party stakeholders, and aiming to have content relevant to all parties. The CMA also invites parties, the constituted bodies, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, climate finance institutions, observers and observer organizations, and others to submit views on the issues to be addressed in 2025.

**Seventh review of the Financial Mechanism:** Debates on this item relate to the role, or not, of the CMA in the review of the Financial Mechanism. President Babayev reported that Presidency consultations did not reach an agreement and therefore Rule 16 would apply and the item will be included on the agenda of the COP's and CMA's next session.

## Mitigation

**Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme:** The MWP was established in 2021 to scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade. It holds at least two global dialogues each year, as well as investment-focused events. It also provides a space for parties to discuss mitigation-related topics and adopt decisions that can guide further mitigation action in specific sectors.

Discussions on this item considered progress, opportunities, and barriers in implementing the work programme. This agenda item was considered in SB informal consultations on [12](#), [14](#), and [15 November](#), in the SB closing plenary on [16 November](#), and in informal consultations under the CMA on [19 November](#), all co-facilitated by Ursula Fuentes (Germany) and Maesela Kekana (South Africa).

Many developed and developing countries called for reference to the next round of NDCs delivering on the 1.5°C goal. Several emphasized the need to capture high-level messaging on mitigation from the GST, with some noting this could be done in a CMA cover decision and others pointing to the discussions on the dialogue



on GST implementation as a suitable place. The LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, and AFRICAN GROUP preferred focusing on procedural arrangements for future dialogues and investment-focused events. They emphasized, among others: enhancing the party-driven nature of the topic selection; balanced representation of developed and developing countries, including on panels; and discontinuing the use of breakout groups.

As parties could not reach agreement, the SBs agreed that, in accordance with Rule 16, the matter will be included on the SB 62 agendas. Accordingly, the SBs could not forward any draft text for further consideration under the CMA.

Consultations continued under the CMA during the second week, but views remained divergent. The AFRICAN GROUP proposed improvements to the dialogues and investment-focused events, procedural elements relating to work in 2025, and additional guidance to the MWP Co-Chairs on topic selection. AOSIS called for: reflecting the latest science, including on the urgency of addressing climate change; and more inclusive topic selection, noting most of the topics suggested by SIDS were not taken up. The EIG proposed reflecting how the MWP can support NDCs' implementation and specifying how the MWP could address the GST outcome. The EU suggested a progress report that considers collective implementation of the GST's mitigation outcome.

During the stocktaking plenary on [20 November](#), Dion Travers George (South Africa) noted ministerial consultations focused on what parties consider to be the outcomes and political messages needed from Baku, and whether these should be placed under the MWP or other agenda items.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.23](#)), the CMA, *inter alia*, notes the focused exchange of views during the global dialogues and investment-focused events in 2024, on the topic “cities: buildings and urban systems” and notes the key findings summarized in the 2024 annual report, relating to the built environment, international cooperation, cooperation among cities, and sociocultural and economic context, and urban planning.

The CMA further requests the Secretariat to organize, under the guidance of the work programme Co-Chairs, future global dialogues and investment-focused events in such a manner as to:

- enhance regional and gender balance among invited experts;
- increase the number of participants from each party, particularly developing countries, including by expanding virtual participation opportunities;
- enable parties to contribute to determining the agenda, subtopics, and guiding questions for the dialogues and events with a view to enhancing transparency;
- enhance the matchmaking function to assist parties in accessing finance, including investment, grants, and concessional loans; and
- enhance understanding of regional perspective.

The CMA further:

- notes the discussion at this session regarding the creation of a digital platform to facilitate implementation of mitigation actions by enhancing collaboration between governments, financiers, and other stakeholders on developing investable projects in a country-owned and nationally determined manner; and
- invites submissions on the design and features of the platform to inform an exchange of views at SB 62.

**Matters Relating to Paris Agreement Article 6: Guidance on Cooperative Approaches referred to in Article 6.2:** Article 6.2 provides a framework of principles and guidance for parties that wish to pursue voluntary bilateral cooperation in the implementation

of their NDCs, and specifically for the trade of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), the use of which is authorized by participating parties, although any organization, including companies, can use the credits.

This sub-item was considered in informal consultations under the SBSTA on [12](#) and [13](#) November, and in a contact group and informal consultations under the CMA on [18 November](#), all co-facilitated by Maria AlJishi (Saudi Arabia) and Peer Stiansen (Norway). Parties discussed issues relating to the definition of cooperative approaches, authorizations, and inconsistencies in reporting. One of the key issues of divergence related to the functionality of the international registry and its interoperability with the Article 6.4 and national registries. This issue was ultimately taken up in ministerial consultations, while parties continued other technical discussions in informal consultations.

The AFRICAN GROUP expressed flexibility about definitions, but noted the need to distinguish between ITMOs that are to be used for meeting other parties' NDCs and those to be used for other international mitigation purposes. On the format of authorizations, AOSIS called for minimum mandatory elements and the development of a voluntary template that parties can use.

Views diverged on the permissibility of changes to authorization, with some parties supporting changes before first transfer, noting authorization is a national prerogative, and others opposing any changes. The UK called for specifying that after the first transfer, changes will only be allowed in extraordinary circumstances, such as force majeure.

On the process for identifying and addressing inconsistencies in reporting, countries debated the prescriptiveness of guidance on what constitutes a “significant” or “persistent” inconsistency. The UK proposed linking the definition of “significant” to double counting, while the EU saw the need for a broader, “graded” definition. AOSIS called for addressing inconsistencies in both quantitative and qualitative information. Various parties also stressed the need to detail a link to trigger liaison with the Paris Agreement Implementation and Compliance Committee in certain cases of inconsistencies identified by the reviewers. The LMDCs opposed language on consequences of inconsistencies.

ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs and YOUTH NGOs cautioned against watering down requirements that ensure environmental integrity, and WOMEN AND GENDER lamented the lack of reference to just transition, empowerment of women, gender equality, and mandatory stakeholder intervention and consultations.

On the international registry, the US opposed any functionality beyond tracking and recording data on party actions relating to ITMOs, cautioning that expanding the functions would require an extensive work programme and could lead to parties having to reformulate national arrangements to align with those of the international registry. Noting the group is not calling for the registry to perform issuances, the AFRICAN GROUP supported allowing countries that do not have registries to use the international registry for functions such as authorization, transfers, and use of credits. Similar views were shared by GRUPO SUR, AOSIS, and the LDCs. Many stressed the need for capacity building to enable parties to develop national registries.

During the stocktaking plenary on [20 November](#), Grace Fu (Singapore) reported a potential landing ground identified during ministerial consultations, comprising a “dual layer registry system” whereby the international registry would form an “accounting layer” for tracking units, while the Secretariat would provide an optional service outside the registry with additional functions, including

transfer and holding of units. She noted convergence that the international registry would not have an issuance function. Simon Watts (New Zealand) noted constructive exchanges on other issues, including upfront information and addressing inconsistencies.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.15](#)), the CMA, *inter alia*:

- decides and sets out the elements each participating party shall include in the authorization of use of the ITMOs from each cooperative approach;
- requests the Secretariat to develop and publish a voluntary standardized user-friendly template that each participating party may use to provide the information outlined in the paragraph above;
- decides that any changes to authorization of the use of ITMOs shall not apply to, or affect, mitigation outcomes that have already been first transferred, unless otherwise specified by the participating parties in applicable terms and conditions that specify the circumstances for such changes and the process for managing them, in order to avoid double counting;
- notes that the submission of an initial report or updated initial report by each participating party with respect to a cooperative approach is a requirement for submitting, in an agreed electronic format, annual information on the ITMOs from that cooperative approach;
- decides the results of the consistency checks of submitted information performed by the Secretariat will be made publicly available on the centralized accounting and reporting platform and show whether reported information submitted by a participating party and/or between parties participating in the same cooperative approach is consistent, inconsistent, or not available;
- decides that inconsistencies in relation to the consistency check shall be corrected by the relevant participating party submitting revised agreed electronic formats until consistency is achieved and verified by the Secretariat by performing another consistency check;
- requests parties not to use the ITMOs that are identified as inconsistent in the consistency check, which would have an impact on the adjusted emissions balance, toward achievement of NDCs in order to ensure the avoidance of double counting;
- clarifies that the connection of the Article 6.4 mechanism registry and participating party registries to the international registry shall enable the ability to pull and view data and information on holdings and the action history of authorized Article 6.4 emission reductions, and enable the transfer of authorized Article 6.4 emission reductions as ITMOs to the international registry, consistent with the interoperability arrangements applicable to all registries; and
- requests the Secretariat to provide, as an additional service for parties that request it, registry services through which a party may issue mitigation outcomes as units, the use of which it has authorized or intends to authorize, in order to support the participation of the party in cooperative approaches.

**Rules, Modalities, and Procedures for the Mechanism established by Article 6.4:** Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement establishes a mechanism, under the authority and guidance of the CMA, to contribute to the mitigation of GHG emissions and support sustainable development. While Article 6.2 focuses on voluntary agreements between countries or countries and other organizations to trade mitigation outcomes, Article 6.4 establishes a centralized

mechanism that is overseen by the CMA and administered by the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body.

This sub-item was first considered during the SBSTA [opening plenary](#), where parties adopted a decision taking note of the Supervisory Body's adoption of two standards without engaging in substantive negotiations thereon. Discussions then continued in informal consultations under the SBSTA on [12](#) and [15](#) November, and in a contact group and informal consultations under the CMA on [13](#) and [18](#) November, all co-chaired and co-facilitated by Kate Hancock (Australia) and Sonam Tashi (Bhutan).

The AFRICAN GROUP noted there is already a decision about the linkage between the mechanism and international registries, and any new decision must take this into account. Most parties further underlined that the authorization process should be identical or streamlined for both the Article 6.2 cooperative approaches and Article 6.4 mechanism.

AOSIS stressed authorization should be no later than issuance, but if such authorization is to be permitted, there should be a time limit of two years after issuance, which the AFRICAN GROUP, GRUPO SUR and others opposed. AILAC supported guidance relating to a post-crediting monitoring period and JAPAN called for work on baseline tools and implementation of the mechanism registry.

GRUPO SUR supported addressing the transition of CDM afforestation and reforestation projects to the Article 6.4 mechanism. Several parties questioned the EU's proposal to request the Supervisory Body to consider the additionality of CDM projects that are requesting transition, noting existing rules on CDM additionality and on transitioning CDM projects to the Article 6.4 mechanism.

**Final Outcomes:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.1](#)), the CMA, *inter alia*:

- takes note of the Supervisory Body's adoption of the "[Standard: Application of the requirements of Chapter V.B \(Methodologies\) for the development and assessment of Article 6.4 mechanism methodologies](#)" and the "[Standard: Requirements for activities involving removals under the Article 6.4 mechanism](#)"; and
  - notes that the Supervisory Body will expeditiously elaborate the standards referred to above, while striving to ensure regulatory stability, and will report on the progress made on the application of those standards in its annual report to the CMA.
- In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.16](#)), the CMA, *inter alia*:
- requests the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body to engage, in consultation with interested stakeholders, further independent scientific and technical expertise and local communities, and include the knowledge, sciences and practices of Indigenous Peoples, as relevant, to support its work, including through its expert panels, to review proposals as necessary and receive independent scientific and technical advice;
  - requests the Supervisory Body, while ensuring ongoing continuous improvements to reflect the best available science, to strive to ensure regulatory stability by avoiding frequent substantive revisions to its adopted standards, tools, and procedures;
  - encourages the Supervisory Body to expedite its work on further standards, tools, and guidelines relating to baselines, downward adjustment, standardized baselines, suppressed demand, additionality, and leakage, as well as non-permanence and reversals including aspects of post-crediting period monitoring, reversal risk assessments, and remediation measures;

- decides the host party may authorize, for use toward achievement of NDCs and/or for other international mitigation purposes, mitigation contribution Article 6.4 emission reductions already issued by providing to the Supervisory Body a statement of authorization within the specified time frame referred to below, which applies from the date of issuance prior to any transfer of the mitigation contribution Article 6.4 emission reductions in or out of the mechanism registry, and applying the requirements for corresponding adjustments with respect to the corresponding mitigation contribution Article 6.4 emission reductions already forwarded for share of proceeds for adaptation, and canceled to deliver overall mitigation in global emissions;
- requests the Supervisory Body to consider and determine whether, based on its experience, there is a need to set a time limit, from the date of issuance to when the host party shall provide a statement of authorization, and report back in its annual report to CMA 7; and
- decides the participating party registries may voluntarily connect to the mechanism registry, and the connection shall enable the transfer of authorized Article 6.4 emission reductions, while ensuring avoidance of double counting and the ability to pull and view data and information on holdings and the action history of authorized Article 6.4 ERs.

**Work Programme under the Framework for Non-Market Approaches referred to in Article 6.8:** Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement defines a framework for non-market approaches (NMAs) which aim to assist parties in the implementation of their NDCs and to promote mitigation and adaptation ambition, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. This sub-item was considered in a contact group and informal consultations under the SBSTA on [12](#) and [13](#) November, co-facilitated and co-chaired by Kristin Qui (Samoa) and Jacqui Ruesga (New Zealand).

One of the tasks for parties during this meeting was to undertake an “expedited and simple assessment” of the progress and outcomes of the first phase (2023-2024) of the work programme under the NMA framework, to improve and recommend the schedule for implementing the second phase (2025-2026). During the opening contact group, the Secretariat highlighted: there are no NMAs recorded on the web-based platform yet; and 78 national focal points have been designated, up from 52 at SBSTA 60.

On phase one assessment, the LMDCs proposed undertaking a quantitative assessment of how NMAs have helped countries implement their NDCs. The COALITION FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS and the LMDCs urged continued consideration of phase one topics even during phase two, saying these have not been properly addressed.

On phase two, recommendations included: using spin-off groups to deep dive into specific topics, with parties facilitating; and updating the web-based platform to enable the registration of individual NMAs.

**Final Outcome:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.15](#)), the SBSTA, *inter alia*, welcomed the expedited and simple assessment of the first phase of implementing the work programme activities, undertaken with a view to improving and recommending the schedule for implementing the work programme activities for the second phase, and recommends a draft decision for adoption by the CMA.

In its decision ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.15/Add.1](#)), the CMA, *inter alia*:

- notes, in the first phase, parties have identified and framed all relevant elements of the work programme activities, and the Secretariat has developed the NMA Platform and an associated user manual;
- recalls the second phase will focus on fully implementing the work programme activities;
- requests the Secretariat to provide regular updates on the status of the development of the NMA Platform and provide a quantitative report on the activities on the NMA Platform for each meeting of the Glasgow Committee on NMAs, which may include the number of nominated Article 6.8 national focal points, the number of submitted NMAs, and other relevant information;
- encourages interested parties to showcase examples of NMAs by recording them on the NMA Platform; and
- invites submissions on: barriers to using the NMA Platform and potential solutions; engagement with the NMA Platform and the challenges encountered in unlocking its full potential; and how NMAs can support a party’s implementation of its NDC.

**Further guidance on NDC features:** The CMA agreed in 2018 to discuss further guidance on the features of NDCs in 2024, before the next round of NDCs is due in 2025. The CMA considered this item in a contact group co-chaired by Sin Liang Cheah (Singapore) and Federica Fricano (Italy), which met on [13](#), [16](#), and [19](#) November.

Throughout the discussions, parties could not agree on what an NDC feature is, and, therefore, whether guidance on additional features would be needed. While AOSIS, the EIG, and others cited potential additional features such as NDCs being aligned with the 1.5°C goal, the LMDCs and ARAB GROUP stressed that NDCs are nationally determined, and additional features should not be specified.

Parties could not agree whether to conclude this item, defer it to another date, or continue discussions with a view to informing the 2025 NDCs.

**Final Outcome:** The CMA decided to continue consideration of this matter at CMA 8 (November 2026).

**Periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress toward achieving it:** In 2010, under the COP, parties agreed on a long-term global goal to reduce GHG emissions to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and decided to periodically review the adequacy of and progress toward this goal at least every seven years. The outcome of the first review (2013-2015) was a contributing factor to the Paris Agreement’s objective of pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. The second periodic review concluded in 2022. This agenda item was considered in a contact group co-chaired by Jolene Cook (UK) and Leon Charles (Grenada), which met, among others, on [20 November](#).

Parties could not agree on whether to continue the periodic review. The US and others viewed it as redundant to the GST, while the LDCs and others proposed preparing for future periodic reviews. Views diverged on when to discuss this issue again.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.7](#)), the COP decides to continue considering this matter at COP 30.

**Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport:** This agenda item was considered in informal consultations on [14 November](#), among others, co-facilitated by Jakob Wiesbauer-Lenz (EU) and Pacifica Achieng Ogola (Kenya). Parties reiterated long-standing divergent views and could not



agree on text that: acknowledges the presence of International Civil Aviation Organization and International Maritime Organization representatives at the session; requests these bodies to assess the impacts of their proposed goals on developing countries; and references the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

**Final Outcome:** In its closing plenary on 18 November, the SBSTA agreed to continue consideration of this agenda item at SBSTA 62.

**Matters relating to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM):** The CDM is a market mechanism established under the Kyoto Protocol. This item was considered in informal consultations under the SBSTA on [14](#) and [15](#) November, and in a contact group and informal consultations under the CMP on [18](#) and [19](#) November, both co-facilitated by Karoliina Anttonen (Finland) and Alick Muvundika (Zambia). The two main issues discussed were: setting timelines for the phased discontinuation of the CDM's operations, processes, and institutions; and transferring funds from the CDM Trust Fund to other areas. Regarding the latter, the three main destination options were: the Adaptation Fund; Article 6.4 capacity building; or Article 6 infrastructure.

Following discussions of these issues under the SBSTA, parties were unable to reach any agreement, and in accordance with Rule 16, the matter will be included in the provisional agenda for SBSTA 62. However, as the agenda item was also on the CMP agenda, the CMP continued consideration of this during the second week.

During the SBSTA and CMP informal consultations, the Secretariat responded to clarification questions raised by parties on matters such as the projected year-end balance of the CDM Trust Fund. They elaborated on the various uncertainties relating to liabilities from staff allocations and processing fees from issuances, noting an accurate estimate will only be possible once countries have decided on the deadline for issuances. The Secretariat noted that, with certainty, USD 12.78 million would be available for 2025.

Most parties, including AOSIS, the EU, AILAC, and others, supported setting the earliest date possible for ceasing CDM activities. The LMDCs, the ARAB GROUP, and BRAZIL opposed a decision on timelines at this session and preferred to continue consideration of the matter at CMP 20. The LMDCs pointed to discussions under Article 6.4 about additional requirements that could prevent many CDM projects from transitioning to the Article 6.4 mechanism and opposed "stranding" such projects.

Most parties supported transfer to the Adaptation Fund, with divergent views about additional destinations, if any. The UK supported transferring to both the Adaptation Fund and Article 6 activities, preferring not to specify which Article 6 activities would benefit from the transfer. The EIG noted that transferring funds to Article 6 should be an allocation, not a loan. The LMDCs expressed willingness to consider transfer to the Adaptation Fund only. The AFRICAN GROUP reiterated their preference to transfer funds to both the Adaptation Fund and for Article 6 capacity building, but proposed, supported by AOSIS, an alternative option of transferring to the Adaptation Fund only.

In the closing contact group meeting, the Co-Chairs noted lack of consensus on the text and reported they will forward the bracketed draft text to the Presidency, which eventually reached agreement.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/KP/CMP/2024/L.3](#)), the CMP, *inter alia*:

- takes note of the work undertaken from 28 September 2023 - 7 November 2024 by the Executive Board, its panels, and the

- Secretariat in overseeing the implementation of the CDM and maintaining stakeholder engagement in its operations;
- designates as operational entities those entities that have been accredited and provisionally designated as such by the Executive Board to carry out sectoral scope-specific validation and/or verification functions as set out in the annex; and
- takes note of the progress made by the Executive Board in addressing the issue of non-responsive designated national authorities and requests the Executive Board to continue following up with non-responsive designated national authorities, as necessary.

**Report on the high-level ministerial roundtable on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments:** President Babayev reported that Presidency consultations did not yield agreement and Rule 16 would apply.

### Adaptation

**Matters relating to the Global Goal on Adaptation:** The GGA of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change was established by Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. At CMA 3, parties launched a work programme to flesh out the GGA in more detail. At CMA 5 they established the GGA Framework that includes a range of thematic and dimensional targets for climate adaptation and resilience, and launched a process aimed at defining adaptation indicators.

Discussions on this agenda item first occurred in SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Tina Kobilšek (Slovenia) and Lamin Dibba (The Gambia) on [12](#), [13](#), [15](#), and [16](#) November. Parties engaged with a report on progress in defining adaptation indicators ([FCCC/SB/2024/6](#)). They agreed that further guidance to the expert group was needed, but expressed differing views about: the precise number and content of indicators; how to strike a balance between indicators' global aggregability and their specificity to regional and national contexts; and whether there should be indicators to track MoI, which many developing countries favored but the EU, the UK, JAPAN, and CANADA, among others, rejected. There was further disagreement about: the need for a standalone agenda item on the GGA; the relationship between the GGA and the GST; and whether to engage in substantive discussions on the Secretariat's technical paper on transformational adaptation ([FCCC/TP/2024/8](#)), given its late publication. In their conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.12](#)), the SBs agreed to forward a draft decision to CMA 6.

Discussions on the draft decision continued in CMA informal consultations on [19 November](#), and later in ministerial and Presidency consultations co-facilitated by Franz Tattenbach Capra (Costa Rica) and Eamon Ryan (Ireland) on [20 November](#), among others.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.20](#)), the CMA, among others, with regard to the GGA indicators:

- acknowledges the significant progress made by the technical experts in their work on indicators;
- confirms that CMA 7 will decide on a final list of indicators;
- recognizes that further guidance is required for the experts to apply common approaches and methodologies, enhance collaboration across thematic and dimensional targets, and prioritize reducing the number of global indicators;
- identifies additional criteria for the experts to consider;
- decides that the final outcomes may include a manageable set of no more than 100 indicators that are globally applicable and constitute a menu that captures various contexts of adaptation

action, enabling parties to choose which indicators they will report on;

- decides that indicators should, among others, capture specific ecosystems, the vulnerability of children, and track MoI; and
- requests the SB Chairs to invite the experts to submit their input on indicators in time to enable the issuance of reports no later than four weeks prior to SB 62.

On the relationship between the GGA and the GST, the CMA:

- decides that party reporting on indicators should feed into the technical phase of the GST process by specifying a way to structure and inform the assessment of progress in adaptation;
- calls on parties to update their adaptation communications and prepare their BTRs taking into account the GGA Framework and requests the Secretariat to review progress toward achieving the GGA targets and report on its findings in the synthesis report to be prepared as part of the second GST; and
- decides to undertake the review of the GGA Framework after the second GST.

The CMA further:

- affirms that the agenda item on matters relating to the GGA is a standing agenda item;
- establishes a high-level dialogue on adaptation to be convened on the margins of each CMA session;
- welcomes the work of the IPCC in revising and updating its 1994 Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations and invites the SBSTA to organize a special event at SB 62 for the IPCC to provide an update on its ongoing work; and
- takes note of the Secretariat's technical paper on transformational adaptation and requests the Secretariat to prepare a reader-friendly summary of the paper.

**Report of the Adaptation Committee:** The Adaptation Committee aims to promote the coherent implementation of enhanced action on adaptation. The Adaptation Committee was established in 2010 as part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework to drive forward coherent UNFCCC action on adaptation worldwide by providing expert guidance, enhancing outreach, and supporting the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement. At SB 60, it was decided to consider the Adaptation Committee report and the Adaptation Committee review separately to facilitate agreement.

Parties met for informal consultations co-facilitated by Lina Yassin (Sudan) and Geert Fremout (Belgium) on [12](#), [13](#), [14](#), and [15](#) November. Discussions initially touched upon the Adaptation Committee's work and output, including its connection to work on the GGA indicators. In later sessions, the modalities of negotiation took preference over substance, with the AFRICAN GROUP repeatedly rejecting draft text developed by the Co-Facilitators.

**Final Outcome:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.9](#)), the SBSTA recommends that the COP and CMA welcome the 2023 and 2024 reports of the Adaptation Committee ([FCCC/SB/2023/5](#) and [FCCC/SB/2024/4](#)), which they did.

**Review of the progress, effectiveness, and performance of the Adaptation Committee:** Informal consultations took place, among others, on [12](#), [14](#), and [15](#) November and were co-facilitated by Lina Yassin (Sudan) and Geert Fremout (Belgium). Parties disagreed about whether the review should be conducted under the authority of the COP only, or also under the CMA. NORWAY proposed a bridging solution, suggesting this review could be finalized through a COP decision, while also initiating a new review under both COP and CMA to better reflect existing mandates. The AFRICAN GROUP, ARAB GROUP, and LMDCs opposed. The EU and

NORWAY, among others, voiced their deep disappointment over stalled progress. The US said parties "should be ashamed" to once again delay work on the Committee, which is crucial to support responses to worsening climate risks.

**Final Outcome:** In their closing plenary on [16 November](#), the SBs decided to forward this matter to SB 62 for further consideration, as later confirmed by the COP and CMA in their closing plenaries.

**National Adaptation Plans:** NAPs were established as part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework with the objective of reducing vulnerability to the impacts of climate change by building adaptive capacity and resilience. Noting lack of progress in formulating and implementing NAPs, COP 24 embarked on a renewed push for adaptation action in collaboration with the LDC Expert Group (LEG) and the Adaptation Committee.

Parties met in SBI informal consultations co-facilitated by Meredith Ryder-Rude (US) and Antwi-Boasiako Amoah (Ghana) on [13](#), [14](#), [15](#), and [16](#) November. They discussed an informal note forwarded by SB 60, but views differed on key issues such as: whether to reference developed countries' obligations to provide MoI for the formulation and implementation of NAPs; the role of the private sector as a provider of adaptation finance; and language on mainstreaming adaptation. Despite significant progress made, parties could not reach agreement by the conclusion of the SBs and decided, against the Presidency's intentions, to forward a draft decision for continued consideration in the second week under the COP. COP informal consultations convened on [19](#) and [20](#) November. Parties elaborated a draft decision text, but ultimately no consensus on the substance was found.

**Final Outcome:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.18](#)), the SBI forwarded the matter for further consideration by COP 29 on the basis of draft text prepared at SBI 61. In its procedural conclusions, the COP invites SBI 21 to continue consideration of this matter on the basis of the [draft decision text](#) prepared at the session.

**Matters related to LDCs:** The LEG was first established in 2001 to support developing countries in formulating and implementing NAPs. Its mandate has since been extended multiple times. The LEG meets twice a year to develop and review progress on the implementation of its work programme through a variety of modalities, including technical guidelines and papers, training activities, and workshops.

Informal consultations co-facilitated by Rik den Hoedt (Netherlands) and Ephraim Shitima (Zambia) took place on [12](#), [15](#), and [16](#) November. Discussions centered, among others, around: the [report](#) of the 46th meeting of the LEG in August 2024; the difficulties LDCs face in accessing financial support for the formulation and implementation of NAPs; and the relationship between the LEG and the GGA and the GST, including whether this item fell under the authority of the COP and the CMA, or the COP only.

**Final Outcome:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.17](#)), the SBI, among others:

- welcomes the updating of the technical guidelines for the NAP process, to be taken into account in the formulation and implementation of NAPs, to reflect the GGA targets; and
  - agrees to continue, at SBI 63, the consideration of the steps for the stocktake of the work of the LEG, scheduled to take place at COP 31, with a view to recommending draft decisions for consideration by COP 30 and CMA 7 (November 2025).
- In its decision ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.17/Add.1](#)), the COP, *inter alia*:

- requests the LEG to hold its NAP writing workshops early in 2025 and encourages the LEG to regularly invite the LDCs' direct access entities under the GCF to participate; and
- decides to conduct, in parallel with the CMA, the stocktake of the LEG's work aimed at reviewing, at the midway point before the next review of the LEG's mandate, its progress and terms of reference.

### Loss and Damage

**Joint annual report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism and the Santiago Network:** Established in 2013, the WIM is the constituted body tasked with implementing mandates related to loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow-onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The WIM Executive Committee (ExCom) implements its work through a five-year rolling workplan and oversees the work of five thematic expert groups. In 2019, parties established the Santiago Network to catalyze technical assistance on loss and damage. At CMA 4, it was decided that the annual reports of the ExCom and Santiago Network would be considered jointly.

SB Informal consultations co-facilitated by Pasha Carruthers (Cook Islands) and Farhan Akhtar (US) convened on [13](#), [14](#), [15](#), and [16](#) November. Parties discussed the joint annual report ([FCCC/SB/2024/2](#)) and welcomed significant advances in operationalizing the Santiago Network. AILAC called for the swift establishment of regional offices, with the AFRICAN GROUP requesting at least two to be located in Africa. The LDCs emphasized the distinction between funding for the Santiago Network and pledges to the new Loss and Damage Fund. AILAC and the AFRICAN GROUP urged delivery of outstanding pledges to the Network. After further discussions in informal informal consultations, parties identified potential landing zones on issues such as: regional offices of the Santiago Network; coherence and complementarity among different bodies in the loss and damage landscape; enhanced finance; and the possibility of publishing a state of loss and damage report. Although most parties wanted to forward a Co-Facilitators' informal note that captures the progress made to the governing bodies, the AFRICAN GROUP objected. As no agreement was reached under the SBs, the issue will be taken up again at SB 62. However, consideration of the joint annual report continued under the COP and CMA, in conjunction with the discussions on the 2024 review of the WIM, as reported below.

**2024 Review of the WIM:** At SB 60, parties settled on the terms of reference for the review to be undertaken at SB 61. The review kicked off with a mandated event on [12 November](#). Parties expressed disappointment with the WIM's performance thus far, lamenting that it was a "low-ambition and insufficient" mechanism. Developing countries stressed difficulties in using the WIM's outputs due to their "detached, academic jargon" and language barriers. They suggested strengthening bottom-up approaches and involving practitioners, local communities, and Indigenous Peoples more actively. Delegates also proposed that, among others, the WIM produce annual reports on loss and damage needs and gaps.

Parties met for SB informal consultations led by Pasha Carruthers (Cook Islands) and Farhan Akhtar (US) on [13 November](#), among others. They discussed: increasing the accessibility of the WIM's knowledge products; enhancing coordination and coherence among the WIM, the Santiago Network, and the Loss and Damage Fund; the potential preparation of regular reports on the global state of loss

and damage; and the work of the WIM's Expert Group on Action and Support as well as that of the national loss and damage contact points. No agreement could be reached.

In COP/CMA informal consultations, parties continued consideration of this item in conjunction with the joint annual report of the WIM ExCom and the Santiago Network on [18 November](#). Presidency consultations on [20 November](#) centered on the question of whether the WIM was governed by the CMA alone, as maintained by the EU and the US, or also by the COP, as argued by G-77/CHINA. These discussions yielded no agreement, and parties agreed to continue with the practice of inserting a footnote specifying that decisions adopted under the governing bodies do not prejudice the outcome of discussions on governance.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.9](#)), the CMA, *inter alia*:

- welcomes the progress of the ExCom in implementing its workplan and that of the Advisory Board and interim Secretariat of the Santiago Network in operationalizing the Network;
- adopts the rules of procedure of the Advisory Board of the Santiago Network, which are annexed to the decision; and
- requests the SBs to continue considering the joint annual report and the 2024 WIM review at SB 62, with a view to recommending a draft decision/draft decisions for consideration by the governing body/bodies in November 2025.

In its decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.4](#)), the COP endorses the CMA's decision.

### Global Stocktake

**Dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake outcomes, referred to in paragraph 97 of decision 1/CMA.5:** This dialogue was established in the GST decision ([1/CMA.5](#)) adopted in 2024. At SB 60, parties began to discuss the operationalization of the dialogue and strongly diverged in their views on its expected scope. Some underscored that the dialogue is established in the finance section of the GST decision, and should therefore focus on finance. Many others considered that it should track the implementation of all GST outcomes, not only finance. Accordingly, parties also debated the placement of this item on the CMA agenda, specifically whether to consider it under matters relating to finance or matters relating to the GST. This debate held up agreement on the CMA agenda during the [opening plenary](#) and also occupied much of the time in informal consultations, co-facilitated by Ricardo Marshall (Barbados) and Patrick Spicer (Canada), which met on [14](#), [15](#), [16](#), and [19](#) November. The matter was also taken up in Presidency-led consultations.

On the scope of the dialogue, the LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, and AFRICAN GROUP called for the dialogue to only focus on the provision of finance. Developed countries urged that the dialogue consider all outcomes that have not been taken up by existing constituted bodies or work programmes. With AOSIS, the EIG, and others, they cited mitigation, particularly the energy transition package, as the "outlier" issue that required follow up in the dialogue.

AILAC sought to provide a compromise that the dialogue should consider mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage, with a particular focus on the provision of finance and other MoI. The EIG, AOSIS, the US and others expressed interest in working on this formulation. A range of views was voiced on modalities, with many preferring a narrow list of inputs to avoid creating "a mini-stocktake."



During the closing plenary, the Presidency introduced a draft decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.21](#)). AILAC noted the text does not enjoy consensus, citing its lack of important elements, including the tools and procedures to achieve the GST outcomes and adequately inform NDCs, such as a report to record the main ideas of the dialogue and carry them forward as “standard procedure.” The EIG said it cannot support the draft decision and lamented that some are trying to backtrack on commitments made in Dubai, particularly on the energy transition. AOSIS noted the text falls short of the group’s expectations, while FIJI called it an “affront to this process and to all those begging us to deliver a safe future.” CANADA and AUSTRALIA expressed their disappointment.

**Final Outcome:** The Presidency proposed, and the CMA agreed, to continue consideration of this matter at SB 62 with a view to forwarding a draft decision for adoption by CMA 7.

**Report on the annual dialogue on the GST informing NDC preparation (referred to in paragraph 187 of decision 1/CMA.5):** CMA 5 requested the SB Chairs to organize an annual dialogue to facilitate knowledge transfer on how the GST outcomes can be incorporated into preparing the next round of NDCs. The first edition of this dialogue took place at SB 60 in June 2024.

Parties addressed this matter in CMA informal consultations, co-facilitated by Noura Alissa (Saudi Arabia) and Kaarle Kupiainen (Finland), on [18](#), [19](#), [20](#), and [21](#) November. They debated whether: the dialogue should be continued at all; the Secretariat’s annual synthesis report should feed into the next dialogue; and the draft decision should highlight any substantive messages or only acknowledge the organization of the dialogue.

**Final Outcome:** In the closing plenary, President Babayev reported that consultations did not yield agreement and Rule 16 would apply.

**Procedural and logistical elements of the overall Global Stocktake process:** The GST is a key part of the Paris Agreement’s ratchet mechanism. It is a collective assessment of efforts and results on all areas of the Paris Agreement. After an 18-month technical phase, the task in Dubai was to complete the political phase of the Stocktake, which offered a response to the technical phase’s findings. In Dubai, parties agreed to review their experiences with the first GST to improve how future GSTs will function.

The SBs and CMA considered ways to improve future GSTs in a contact group co-chaired by Thureya Al Ali (UAE) and Patrick Spicer (Canada) that met on [12](#), [14](#), [15](#), [17](#), [18](#), [19](#), [20](#), and [21](#) November.

On inputs, parties debated the role of the IPCC, including inviting it to align its assessment cycle with the GST process, which many supported, but the LMDCs and ARAB GROUP opposed. The EU, the EIG, AOSIS, and others called for recognizing the IPCC as the main source of inputs, while EGYPT and a few others called for a “balance with non-IPCC sources.” Countries also discussed whether to lengthen the political phase of the GST and to specify thematic areas for the technical phase. After continued debate about the role of the IPCC and other issues, the CMA could not adopt a decision.

**Final Outcome:** The CMA requests SB 62 to continue consideration of this matter on the basis of the informal note and its compilation annex with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by CMA 7.

## Reporting under the Convention

**Greenhouse Gas Data Interface:** Under the Convention’s and Kyoto Protocol’s reporting requirements, parties submit GHG inventories. The GHG data interface is an online tool to facilitate access, searching, and sorting of information provided by parties. The SBSTA adopted conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.11](#)).

**Annex-I Reporting: Status of submission and review of national communications and biennial reports:** The SBI took note of the information in the report ([FCCC/SBI/2024/INF.10](#)).

**Compilations and syntheses of biennial reports:** The SBI took note of the information in the report ([FCCC/SBI/2023/INF.7](#)) and agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 62.

**Report on national GHG inventory data:** The SBI took note of the information in the reports ([FCCC/SBI/2023/15](#) and [FCCC/SBI/2024/17](#)), and agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 62.

**Annual reports on technical reviews: Technical review of information reported in biennial reports and national communications:** The SBSTA took note of the information in the 2024 report ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/INF.5](#)).

**Technical review of GHG inventories:** The SBSTA took note of the information in the 2024 report ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/INF.2](#)).

**Technical review of GHG inventories and other information reported:** The SBSTA adopted conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.10](#)).

**Reporting From Non-Annex I Parties: Information contained in national communications:** The SBI agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 62.

**Provision of financial and technical support:** This item relates to the provision of support for developing countries for implementing the measurement, reporting, and verification arrangements under the Convention. It was considered in informal consultations under the SBI, co-facilitated by Julia Gardiner (Australia) and Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa). Parties could not reach agreement. In accordance with Rule 16, the matter will be included on the SBI 62 agenda.

**Summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports of non-Annex I parties:** This item focused on the technical analysis covering countries’ Biennial Update Reports in 2024. The SBI took note of the 180 technical analysis summary reports that were published by 3 September 2024.

**Report of the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE):** The CGE assists developing countries in completing their national reports. This item was considered in informal consultations under the SBI, co-facilitated by Mausami Desai (US) and Xiang Gao (China).

**Final Outcome:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.16](#)), the SBI requests the CGE, in developing and implementing its workplan for 2025, to consider including the following activities, to the extent possible:

- continuing to prepare updates of the technical paper on problems, constraints, lessons learned and capacity-building needs in preparing NDCs, Biennial Update Reports, and BTRs;
- continuing to focus its work on facilitating the preparation and submission of BTRs by developing countries, including through use of the ETF electronic reporting tools;
- providing technical advice and support to developing countries for undergoing the technical expert review of BTRs; and
- developing capacity-building materials pertaining to the reporting requirements that have not been addressed previously by the CGE.

The SBI further:

- notes that, owing to limited financial resources available, the CGE was only able to conduct two regional workshops in 2024, and underlines the importance of the CGE having adequate financial resources to support the full implementation of its annual workplans; and
- encourages the CGE to enhance collaboration with other expert groups and constituted bodies under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, as well as with relevant multilateral programmes and organizations, while avoiding duplication of work in implementing its workplan for 2025.

### **Reporting under the Kyoto Protocol**

**Report of the administrator of the international transaction log under the Kyoto Protocol:** The CMP took note of the report for 2024 ([KP/CMP/2024/5](#)).

**Final compilation and accounting reports for the second commitment period:** The CMP took note of the [reports](#) and concluded consideration of this agenda item.

### **Reporting under the Paris Agreement**

#### **Reporting tools under the Enhanced Transparency**

**Framework:** In SBSTA informal consultations, co-facilitated by Daniela Romano (Italy) and Fredrick Ouma (Kenya), discussions related to, among others, maintaining the interoperability of the tools with the IPCC software in cooperation with the IPCC; further enhancing the tools and incorporating the actions referenced in its presentation during the relevant mandated event at SBSTA 61; and organizing a mandated event at SBSTA 62 to inform parties about these updates.

**Final Outcome:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.12](#)), the SBSTA, among others:

- welcomes the timely completion of the final version of the tools for the electronic reporting of the common reporting tables and common tabular formats under the ETF;
- requests the Secretariat to continue organizing technical training workshops;
- requests the Secretariat to maintain, in cooperation with the IPCC, interoperability between the tools and the IPCC software; and
- requests the Secretariat to further enhance the ETF reporting tools and to organize an event at SBSTA 62 to inform parties on progress.

#### **Provision of financial and technical support to developing**

**countries:** Discussions on this item focused on addressing the challenges faced by developing countries in implementing the ETF. Informal consultations, co-facilitated by Ole-Kenneth Nielsen (Denmark) and Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa), took place on, among others, [12](#) and [18](#) November. Parties welcomed the Secretariat's efforts to provide support for the preparation of the first round of BTRs. Developing country groups also highlighted, among others: issues with regard to the transition between support for reporting under the Convention and the Paris Agreement; assessing financing needs to meet enhanced reporting requirements under the Paris Agreement and factoring these into the next replenishment process under the GEF; GEF funding being insufficient to comply with their reporting obligations under the ETF; and the need for in-house capacity building in developing countries.

Parties could not reach agreement under the SBI, so the matter will be included on the SBI 62 agenda in accordance with Rule 16. Nevertheless, they eventually reached agreement under the CMA.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.13](#)), the CMA:

- emphasizes the importance of the continued provision of support for building the transparency-related capacity of developing countries on a continuous basis;
- welcomes the Secretariat's efforts in delivering capacity building for the implementation of the ETF, in particular through regional online and in-person workshops, and encourages the Secretariat to tailor these capacity-building activities to sub-regions that share similar conditions and challenges;
- emphasizes the importance of building the capacity of developing countries to transition from *ad hoc* reporting approaches to government-led, systematic, and institutionalized processes for preparing and submitting national reports under the ETF;
- requests the Secretariat to organize a workshop at SB 62 in consultation with the GEF and its implementing agencies to facilitate the sharing of experiences of developing countries in preparing their first BTRs, including in accessing the funds received and their adequacy for the sustainability of the implementation of the ETF; and
- requests the Secretariat to prepare a summary report on the workshop by no later than three weeks prior to the CMA 7.

### **Technology Transfer and Development and Capacity Building**

#### **Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Technology Centre and Network:**

Discussions on this item aimed at considering the joint annual report of the TEC and CTCN ([FCCC/SB/2024/3](#)). This issue was negotiated under the SBs in informal consultations co-facilitated by Carlos Fuller (Belize) and Elfriede More (Austria). During its closing plenary on [16 November](#), the SBs recommended draft decisions for adoption by the COP and CMA.

**Final Outcomes:** In its decision ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.11](#)), the COP, *inter alia*:

- welcomes with appreciation the enhanced collaboration and coordination between the TEC and CTCN, and encourages them to continue collaboration to maximize the impact of their work;
- decides to conduct a review of the functions, and decide whether to extend the term, of the Climate Technology Centre at COP 30, taking into account the findings of the first and second independent reviews of the effective implementation of the CTCN and the findings of the first periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support provided to the bodies of the Technology Mechanism in supporting implementation of the Paris Agreement on matters relating to technology development and transfer; and
- invites the CMA to participate in the review.

In its decision ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.10](#)), the CMA decides to participate in conducting the review of the functions, and in deciding whether to extend the term, of the Climate Technology Centre at CMA 7.

In both decisions, the COP and CMA also request SBI 62 to initiate this review with a view to recommending draft decisions to COP 30 and CMA 7, respectively.

#### **Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the**

**Financial Mechanism:** Discussions on this item took place with a view to continue consideration of linkages, collaboration, and cooperation between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism, taking into account submissions from parties and other stakeholders, and the synthesis report by the Secretariat on

those submissions and outcomes from the workshop held at SBI 60 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/16](#)). Informal SBI consultations co-facilitated by Ekaterine Mikadze (Georgia) and Stephen Minas (Greece) convened, among others, on [15 November](#).

Key debates revolved around, among others, the request to the Secretariat to prepare a technical report with consolidated information and data on linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism, including on the support provided by the GEF and the GCF for implementing outcomes of technology needs assessments. Parties could not reach consensus and agreed to continue consideration of the matter at SBI 62.

**Final Outcomes:** In its closing plenary on [16 November](#), the SBI adopted procedural conclusions and decided to forward this matter to SBI 62 for further consideration, as later confirmed by President Babayev on 23 November.

**Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer:**

Considering many of the climate technology activities under the Poznan strategic programme have been completed, discussions on this item took place with a view to taking stock of progress and successes in and lessons learned from implementing the programme. Parties also debated the results of the GST relating to technology, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP 29, with the aim of supporting the implementation of activities, such as those identified and prioritized in developing countries' NDCs, NAPs, technology needs assessments and technology action plans, and long-term strategies. Informal consultations co-facilitated by Duduzile Nhlegentwa-Masina (Eswatini) and Stig Svenningsen (Norway) convened on [12](#), [13](#), [14](#), and [15 November](#) under the SBI and later under the COP on [20 November](#).

Key debates revolved around whether to continue consideration of this agenda item, whether closing the agenda item means closing the Poznan strategic programme, and whether the programme can be extended. Parties also discussed how to best capture lessons learned from the Poznan strategic programme to inform the operationalization of the technology implementation programme (TIP), which was established in the GST decision ([1/CMA.5](#)).

**Final Outcomes:** In its decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.3](#)), the COP, *inter alia*:

- requests the Secretariat, under the guidance of the TEC and in consultation with the GEF, to prepare a report, for consideration by SBI 64 (June 2026), on the evaluation of the Poznan strategic programme, to take stock of progress, challenges, and successes in and lessons learned from implementing the programme; and
- requests the SBI to consider this report with a view to recommending a draft decision on this matter for consideration by COP 31 (November 2026) with the aim of supporting the implementation of activities, such as those identified and prioritized in developing countries' NDCs, NAPs, technology needs assessments, technology action plans and long-term strategies, and informing the TIP.

**Technology implementation programme:** This new programme was established in the GST decision ([1/CMA.5](#)). Informal consultations, co-facilitated by Duduzile Nhlegentwa-Masina (Eswatini) and Stig Svenningsen (Norway), took place on, among others, [12 November](#) under the SBI and later under the CMA on [18](#), [19](#), and [20 November](#).

Key debates revolved around the modalities of the TIP and its governing arrangements. On modalities, parties mostly agreed that the TIP should include in-session dialogues, with different views on number and topics, as well as on ways to ensure the programme

delivers. The G-77/CHINA, for example, proposed both global and regional dialogues; and, as a second component, envisioned an implementation accelerator and a national system of innovation hubs, to be funded by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism. The EU preferred the TEC and CTCN perform implementation functions through building endogenous capacities in developing countries. At the same time, the UK noted that discussion on implementation aspects of the TIP is premature.

On governing arrangements, parties discussed whether the TIP should fall under the CMA, as the EU and NORWAY emphasized, or both the COP and the CMA, as the AFRICAN GROUP and LDCs supported. Parties also debated whether the TIP should follow up on the GST outcomes.

During the CMA closing plenary, CHILE welcomed the launch of the TIP, highlighting the progress made in linking the Technology Mechanism with the Financial Mechanism under other agenda items as well.

**Final Outcomes:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.8](#)), the CMA:

- decides to launch a process for elaborating the TIP; and
- requests SBI 62 to consider this matter based on deliberations in Baku, as contained in the draft text available on the UNFCCC website, while recognizing that the draft text does not represent consensus among parties, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by CMA 7 to inform and further elaborate the TIP.

**Matters relating to Capacity Building:** Discussions on this item aimed at considering the annual technical progress report of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) for 2024 ([FCCC/2024/SBI/19](#)). Informal consultations under the SBI, co-facilitated by Cristina Carreiras (EU) and Natalie Flores González (Dominican Republic), convened on [15 November](#). Key debates revolved around properly reflecting GST outcomes on capacity building in the work of the PCCB.

**Final Outcomes:** In their respective decisions on the annual technical progress report of the PCCB forwarded by SBI 61 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.13](#) and [FCCC/SBI/2024/L.12](#)), the COP and CMA, *inter alia*:

- invite parties and others to consider the PCCB's recommendations, as contained in the annual report for 2024;
- take note of the 2025 focus area of the PCCB, namely capacity building for designing holistic investment strategies, bankable projects, and stakeholder engagement aimed at strengthening the implementation of NDCs and NAPs in developing countries;
- invite parties and relevant institutions to provide support and resources to the PCCB for implementing its activities; and
- respectively, note and emphasize that capacity gaps and needs still exist in developing countries pertaining to the implementation of the Convention and Paris Agreement.

In addition, the CMA also:

- welcomes the progress of the PCCB in identifying current activities for enhancing the capacity of developing countries to prepare and implement NDCs;
- recalls Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement, which states that all parties should cooperate to enhance the capacity of developing countries to implement the Agreement and that developed countries should enhance support for capacity building actions in developing countries; and
- invites the PCCB to include in its annual report information on how it has integrated, in line with its mandate, relevant outcomes



from the GST, as set out in decision [1/CMA.5](#), in particular paragraphs 111-120.

In their respective decisions on the second review of the PCCB forwarded by SBI 60 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.2/Add.2](#) and [FCCC/SBI/2024/L.2/Add.3](#)), the COP and CMA, *inter alia*:

- welcome the annual technical progress reports of the PCCB for 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023 and take note of the recommendations contained therein;
- reaffirm the need to further promote efficiencies and avoid duplication of efforts in the implementation of capacity-building activities under and outside the Convention and the Paris Agreement;
- welcome the synthesis report on the second review of the PCCB;
- recognize that the following priority areas determined in the first review of the PCCB have helped to focus and guide the work of the Committee: enhancing coherence and coordination of capacity building under the Convention with a focus on avoiding duplication of efforts, including through collaboration with bodies under and outside the Convention that engage in activities related to capacity building; identifying capacity gaps and needs, both current and emerging, and recommending ways to address them; and promoting awareness-raising, knowledge- and information-sharing, and stakeholder engagement with bodies and relevant actors under and outside the Convention;
- decide that the work of the PCCB shall be guided by the priority areas set out in the annex;
- decide to extend the PCCB for five years and to review its progress and need for extension at COP 34 and CMA 11 (2029);
- request SBI 68 (2028) to initiate the preparation of the terms of reference for the PCCB's third review with a view to recommending a decision for consideration by COP 33 and CMA 10 (2028);
- request the PCCB, at its 9th meeting, to develop a workplan for the period of its extension on the basis of the priority areas and activities set out in the annex for consideration by COP 30 and CMA 7;
- request PCCB to extend its current workplan until a new workplan is agreed; and
- invite parties and relevant institutions to provide support and resources to the PCCB for implementing its workplan.

In its decision on the terms of reference for the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the Convention ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.2/Add.1](#)), forwarded by SBI 60, the COP:

- reaffirms its decision to conduct the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries (the review) and adopts its terms of reference;
- invites parties, constituted bodies under the Convention, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, representatives of relevant processes under the Convention and other non-party stakeholders to submit views on the review, and the Secretariat to prepare a technical report based on these submissions for consideration by SBI 62; and
- requests SBI 62 to initiate the review based on the terms of reference, taking into account the submissions, and to complete the work at SBI 63 with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration by COP 30.

## Other Issues

**Just Transition Work Programme:** CMA 4 established the just transition work programme in recognition that sustainable and just solutions to the climate crisis must be founded on meaningful and effective social dialogue and participation of all stakeholders and that the global transition to low emissions provides opportunities and challenges for sustainable economic development and poverty eradication. The work programme organizes dialogues as well as an annual high-level ministerial event to discuss just and equitable transition pathways that include energy, socio-economic, workforce, and other dimensions. A contact group co-chaired by Georg Borsting (Norway) and Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago) convened, among others, on [12](#), [14](#), and [15](#) November under the SBs and later under the CMA in Presidency consultations.

Key debates revolved around: reflecting mitigation ambition and the link between just transition and the 1.5°C goal, as well as recognizing socio-economic opportunities for transitioning away from fossil fuels; the importance of education and skills development and ensuring decent jobs and wages; ensuring labor rights and human rights; finance gaps and providing MoI for just transition; and unilateral trade measures. The LMDCs, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, and a few others: rejected recognizing socio-economic opportunities for transitioning away from fossil fuels; called for Paris Agreement language on the temperature goal; and protested unilateral trade measures. The G-77/CHINA called for closing finance gaps and providing MoI for just transition. The LDCs and the UK stressed the need for skills building to ensure just transition, and AUSTRALIA called for meaningful incorporation of human rights.

In the last session of informal consultations under the SBs on [15 November](#), parties discussed draft text prepared by the Co-Chairs. AOSIS, the EIG, the EU, GRUPO SUR, AFRICAN GROUP, and others supported forwarding the draft text to the CMA for further deliberations, and the LMDCs, OMAN, and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION rejected moving forward with the Co-Chairs' text, stating that it does not incorporate their views on many issues. In its closing plenary on [16 November](#), the SBs concluded that no agreement had been reached and forwarded the issue to the CMA.

**Final Outcome:** During the closing plenary, the Presidency reported that no consensus could be reached on this issue and proposed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 62 with a view to forwarding a draft decision for adoption by CMA 7, which the CMA endorsed.

**Matters relating to the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures under the Convention, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement:** Discussions on this item focused on an annual report of the Forum and the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI) and continued work on the development of a five-year workplan. This issue was negotiated in an SB contact group co-chaired by Xolisa Ngwadla (Botswana) and Magnús Örn Agnesar Sigurðsson (Iceland) and later under the COP, CMP, and CMA.

In their closing plenary on [16 November](#), the SBs concluded that parties could not reach agreement and forwarded the matter to COP 29, CMP 19, and CMA 6, taking into account the draft text prepared at SB 61. Under the COP/CMP/CMA, informal consultations were co-facilitated by Mattias Frumerie (Sweden) and Andrei Marcu (Honduras) and convened, among others, on [21 November](#).

Key debates revolved around whether the Forum and KCI must focus more on the negative impacts, especially when it comes to the cross-border implications of developed countries' climate policies on developing countries, as well as unilateral trade measures. Some parties, like the UK and US, also called for recognizing the co-benefits of climate action. The issue was then discussed in Presidency consultations.

**Final Outcomes:** In their decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.13-FCCC/KP/CMP/2024/L.5-FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.19](#)), the COP, CMP, and CMA, *inter alia*:

- acknowledge the report on the global dialogue prepared by the Secretariat, recognizing that it is not an exhaustive account;
- adopt the workplan of the Forum and its KCI for 2026-2030, and request the Secretariat to support its implementation and the KCI to prepare and include in its annual report for 2025 a timeline and modalities for its implementation of each activity in the workplan; and
- request the Forum to incorporate into its annual workplan the consideration of matters of process and substantive matters related to the work of the KCI at the sessions of the governing bodies on the basis of the annual report of the KCI.

In addition, the COP, CMP, and CMA adopt the updated rules of procedure and the following recommendations forwarded by the Forum:

- recognize the variety of existing just transition frameworks, guidelines, and tools;
- recognize the importance of data availability, institutional and human capacity, and legal and regulatory frameworks, particularly for developing countries;
- encourage parties to integrate just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs into the development and implementation of their NDCs;
- encourage parties to report, and those who have already done so, to continue and enhance the reporting, on the social and economic consequences of response measures, in both a qualitative and a quantitative manner; and
- request the Secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on the information on response measures reported by parties in the BTRs and present it to the KCI at its 13th meeting.

**Report of the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Committee:** The CMP took note of the Committee's ninth annual report ([FCCC/KP/CMP/2024/2](#)).

#### **Matters relating to the Committee to Facilitate Implementation and Promote Compliance of the Paris Agreement:**

Discussions on this item considered the annual report of the Committee ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/7](#)). Informal consultations under the CMA, co-facilitated by Paulette Bynoe (Guyana) and Arne Riedel (Germany), convened, among others, on [12](#) and [18](#) November.

Discussions focused on the Committee's recommendation for updating the NDC registry's archiving procedures to ensure that it reflects which NDC is currently active, and how to best capture it in the decision. Parties agreed to postpone review of the Committee's modalities.

**Final Outcomes:** In its decision ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.7](#)), the CMA:

- decides to postpone the first review of the modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the Committee to CMA 9 (November 2027) owing to the limited experience of the Committee gained to date in implementing those modalities

and procedures, noting that the Committee will gain significant relevant experience in implementing them in connection with the upcoming communications of NDCs and submissions of BTRs and biennial communications of information related to Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement; and

- requests the Committee to undertake the first review of its modalities and procedures with a view to making recommendations for consideration and adoption by the CMA 9.

In its conclusions ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.6](#)), the CMA notes that parties held discussions on the matters contained in Chapter II.B of the annual report of the Committee and concluded that it will continue consideration of this chapter at CMA 7.

**Gender:** Discussions on this item aimed at considering final review of implementation of the enhanced Lima work programme on gender and its GAP, as well as considering the 2024 report on gender composition ([FCCC/CP/2024/4](#)) and the synthesis report on the implementation of gender-responsive climate policies, plans, strategies, and action ([FCCC/CP/2024/5](#)). This matter was addressed in informal consultations, co-facilitated by Marc-André Lafrance (Canada) and Ruleta Thomas (Antigua and Barbuda), convened, among others, on [12](#), [14](#), and [16](#) November under the SBI and later the COP and Presidency consultations also convened, among others, on [18 November](#).

Key debates revolved around language on human rights and diversity, MoI, and the future of the work programme. On human rights and women in all their diversity, AILAC, the EU, BRAZIL, the US, CHILE, CANADA, MEXICO, AUSTRALIA, and WOMEN AND GENDER supported the language, and the AFRICAN GROUP, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, INDONESIA, IRAN, and SAUDI ARABIA opposed. Additionally, parties debated language on Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and violence against women. The AFRICAN GROUP, AOSIS, AILAC, CHINA, and BRAZIL stressed the need to provide MoI.

On the work programme, parties debated whether to acknowledge lack of progress on gender composition. Additionally, the US, YOUTH NGOs, and WOMEN AND GENDER called for a 10-year work programme with a 5-year mid-term review, AUSTRALIA supported a 10-year work programme with a 5-year GAP, and the AFRICAN GROUP preferred a 5-year work programme. Parties also debated language on coordination with relevant UN entities; whether to specifically refer to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification; and support for gender focal points.

In its closing plenary on 24 November, the COP adopted the decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.12](#)), with an oral amendment to replace paragraph 23 with "encourages the Secretariat to consider making sure that all budget proposals have considered the effects on gender equality in its own organizational structure and to appoint gender focal points in relevant departments, provided this does not add to the overall cost or decrease efficiency."

MEXICO welcomed the 10-year extension of the programme and 5-year GAP, but noted they had hoped for stronger language on human rights, including with regard to women's right to live free from violence, the right to a healthy environment, environmental defenders, and access to land. AILAC, CANADA, and CHILE welcomed the extension of the Lima programme to ensure gender considerations are integrated in policies and actions; with AILAC and CANADA calling for the GAP to be adopted at COP 30, and CHILE noting lack of MoI.

The AFRICAN GROUP welcomed the outcome and its importance to achieve gender balance and women's empowerment,

and raised concern over use in the process of some terms that are “not related to climate,” like “women in all their diversity” and “intersectionality.” They also lamented lack of MoI, forcing African countries to use limited national resources to ensure the programme’s implementation.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.12](#)), the COP, *inter alia*:

- takes note of the reports on gender composition, according to which gender balance in party delegations was achieved at SB 58 and 60, women’s representation in party delegations has remained the same or declined year-on-year since SB 25, and progress in achieving the goal of gender balance in constituted bodies remains inconsistent;
- recognizes that the full, meaningful and equal participation and leadership of women in all aspects of the UNFCCC process and in national- and local-level climate policymaking and action is vital for achieving long-term climate goals;
- encourages UN entities to cooperate with parties on mainstreaming gender- and age-disaggregated data in their existing policies, enabling mechanisms and programmes, across all levels of governance, and to support parties in directly applying the best available science in the collection and analysis of data sets, including on the impacts of extreme weather and slow onset events;
- invites parties to include information on efforts and steps taken to implement the enhanced Lima work programme on gender and any subsequent GAP in their national reporting under the UNFCCC process, as applicable; and
- notes that gender-responsive implementation and MoI can enable parties to raise ambition, as well as enhance gender equality, and just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities.

On extending the Lima work programme on gender, the COP:

- decides to extend it for a period of 10 years;
- decides that a review of its implementation shall be initiated at SBI 70 (June 2029) with a view to SBI 71 (November 2029) concluding the review and recommending a draft decision thereon for consideration by COP 34 (November 2029);
- requests SBI 62 to initiate development of a new GAP with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration by COP 30;
- requests the SBI Chair to organize, with the support of the Secretariat, a technical workshop, to be held at SB 62, to facilitate the design of GAP activities, taking into account, *inter alia*, the progress, challenges, gaps, and priorities identified during the review and the information presented in the synthesis report and their submitted views on format and scope, with a view to informing the development of the new GAP;
- invites relevant public and private entities to increase the gender-responsiveness of climate finance with a view to strengthening the capacity of women;
- encourages parties and relevant public and private entities to strengthen the gender-responsiveness of climate finance with a view to further building the capacity of women and in order to facilitate simplified access to climate finance for grassroots women’s organizations as well as Indigenous Peoples, especially women, and local communities; and
- emphasizes the urgency of scaled-up support for developing countries to implement the work programme on gender and

any subsequent GAP, consistent with relevant provisions of the Convention.

The COP also requests the Secretariat to continue to:

- maintain the position of senior gender focal point to support and monitor the implementation of the enhanced Lima work programme on gender and any subsequent GAP;
- prepare an annual gender composition report and a biennial synthesis report on progress in integrating a gender perspective into constituted body processes;
- provide capacity-building support to constituted bodies and Secretariat staff in integrating a gender perspective into their respective areas of work in collaboration with relevant organizations;
- facilitate support for building and strengthening the skills and capacities of national gender and climate change focal points; and
- support the attendance of national gender and climate change focal points at relevant mandated UNFCCC meetings, upon request and subject to available resources.

In addition, the COP:

- encourages the Secretariat to consider using gender budgeting in its own organizational structure, appointing gender focal points in all departments, and making sure all budget proposals have considered effects on gender equality, provided this does not add to the overall cost but increases efficiency; and
- encourages parties, the Secretariat, and relevant organizations, in implementing the enhanced work programme on gender, to fully engage men and boys as agents and beneficiaries of change and as strategic partners and allies in achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls in the context of climate change.

**Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security:** To recognize the role of agriculture in tackling and adapting to climate change, this four-year Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security kicked off in 2022. It includes the preparation of an annual synthesis report on agriculture-relevant work undertaken by constituted bodies by the Secretariat, the organization of workshops, and the development of an online portal for parties to share information on relevant projects and initiatives.

Informal consultations on this item, co-facilitated by Una May Gordon (Belize) and Claudia Heidecke (Germany), discussed the template for submissions to and elements to be included in the online portal.

**Final Outcome:** In their conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.8](#)), the SBs, among others:

- welcome the Secretariat’s presentation of the online portal;
- request the Secretariat to develop a template for submissions to the portal on the basis of an annexed outline; and
- request the Secretariat to further develop the online portal in line with an annexed list of elements to be included.

**Research and Systematic Observation:** Discussions on this SBSTA item considered updates from the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) and the World Meteorological Organization, a report from the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites and the Coordination Group for Meteorological Satellites, and a report from Earth Information Day 2024. Informal consultations co-facilitated by Patricia Nyinguro (Kenya) and Frank McGovern (Ireland) convened on [12](#), [13](#), [14](#), and [15](#) November. Key debates revolved around recognizing that 2024 is on track to be the hottest



year on record, capturing and addressing gaps in observations, and recognizing the IPCC's work.

The SBSTA conclusions were adopted in plenary on [16 November](#).

**Final Outcome:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.17](#)), the SBSTA:

- takes note of the 2023 WMO Greenhouse Gas Bulletin and the WMO State of the Climate 2024 Update, and expresses utmost concern about the state of the global climate system, with record high atmospheric GHG concentrations being observed in 2023, with 2024 being on track to be the hottest year on record, which is primarily a result of the long-term warming caused by emissions from pre-industrial times until now;
- notes the information provided on changes in the climatic system, both slow onset and extreme events, occurring globally;
- recognizes the need to address data gaps, including in relation to the atmosphere, hydrosphere (including ocean and coastal regions), cryosphere, biosphere, desert and mountainous regions, and critical and vulnerable ecosystems;
- encourages parties to consider the updated GCOS global climate monitoring principles and to enhance coordination of systematic observations;
- requests the SBSTA Chair to consider inviting relevant organizations to present on the progress in the implementation of the Early Warnings for All initiative at a subsequent Earth Information Day;
- emphasizes the urgent need to maintain and expand systematic observations in support of adaptation, as well as deliver Early Warnings for All, a key global initiative for protecting those most vulnerable to the impacts of extreme weather and climate events;
- notes the continued efforts of the Systematic Observations Financing Facility, which currently prioritizes systematic observations in the LDCs and SIDS, invites the Facility to consider extending its support to more countries, and encourages parties and relevant organizations to further strengthen their provision of support to the systematic observation community;
- acknowledges the advancements in digital technologies and innovative systems for Earth observations, prediction, and assessment, such as through artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other novel methods, and noted gaps in the development and deployment of solutions that can be scaled up;
- encourages parties and relevant organizations to continue to establish and support open data-sharing and to develop openly available, reliable, fit-for-purpose, and accessible data products;
- invites submissions on possible themes for and ways to organize Earth Information Day 2025; and
- encourages the SBSTA Chair to consider inviting the scientific community to present at Earth Information Day on how gaps in systematic observations identified in these conclusions are being addressed.

#### **Matters relating to Action for Climate Empowerment**

**(ACE):** This work stream seeks to operationalize Article 6 of the UNFCCC (education, training and public awareness) and Article 12 of the Paris Agreement. ACE focuses on six priority areas aimed at promoting sustainable, low-emissions lifestyles, attitudes, and behavior: climate change education, public awareness, training, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation on these issues. In 2021, parties adopted a ten-year ACE work programme which was further refined in a four-year action plan endorsed in 2022.

SBI informal consultations were co-facilitated by Nathalie Flores González (Dominican Republic) and Arne Riedel (Germany). Parties met, among others, on [14 November](#), and were invited to discuss ACE's 2023 annual summary report, on which there had been no agreement at the two previous SBI sessions, in addition to the 2024 annual report. In a move applauded by various observers, parties invited observers to participate in informal discussions. Building on a compromise reached in this format, parties discussed text on: past and future events, submissions, and reports; empowering all members of society to engage in climate action; and integrating ACE elements into policymaking. A topic of contention was the elements to be included in submissions for the midterm review of the ACE work programme.

**Final Outcome:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.14](#)), the SBI, *inter alia*:

- requests the Secretariat to support the Presidency of COP 30 and CMA 7 to organize an ACE in-session event in November 2025; and
- invites submissions on ACE implementation that might be relevant to the mid-term review of the work programme scheduled for SB 64.

#### **Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform**

**(LCIPP):** The LCIPP was established in the Paris Agreement and operationalized at COP 23 to support exchanging experience, knowledge sharing, and accelerating the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples and local communities within the UNFCCC. Its facilitative working group (FWG) is composed of representatives of local communities, Indigenous Peoples, and parties. The COP adopted a decision forwarded by SBSTA 60 ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.1](#)). CANADA lauded the work of the FWG, encouraging parties to continue to engage and participate in this work.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.1](#)), the COP, *inter alia*:

- acknowledges the role and contributions of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in nature stewardship and climate leadership and the disproportionate effects of climate change on them;
- welcomes the progress of the FWG in facilitating implementation of the LCIPP functions and the report of the FWG including the draft workplan of the LCIPP for 2025-2027;
- decides to continue the mandate of the FWG;
- encourages parties to actively engage under the LCIPP and in the meetings of the FWG;
- invites parties to provide simultaneous interpretation into languages other than UN official languages at meetings of the FWP and mandated events under the LCIPP and requests Secretariat to make necessary arrangements for accommodating such additional simultaneous interpretation;
- requests the FWG propose recommendations on the scope and function of the LCIPP, and prepare a draft workplan for 2028-2031 for consideration by COP 32 through SBSTA 66;
- decides the next review of the FWG will take place in 2027 and requests the SBSTA to conduct the review at SBSTA 66 with a view to adopt a decision at COP 32; and
- invites parties and organizations to provide financial support for LCIPP's implementation of its functions.

**High-Level Champions:** The Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action enables collaboration between governments and non-party stakeholders to ensure implementation of the Paris Agreement through environmental and socio-economic

transformation and to promote higher ambition. To better connect governments with multiple initiatives and streams of work done by non-party stakeholders, the COP appoints two high-level champions.

**Final Outcome:** In its decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.15](#)), the COP *inter alia*:

- recognizes the important role and active engagement of non-party stakeholders in supporting parties in contributing to progress toward achieving the objective of the Convention and the goals of the Paris Agreement; and
- decides to continue to appoint high-level champions, for 2026-2030, to act on behalf of the COP President to facilitate, through high-level engagement, the scaling up and strengthening of voluntary efforts, initiatives, and coalitions, and to continue convening annually a high-level event together with the Executive Secretary and the incumbent and incoming Presidencies.

#### **Administrative, Financial, and Institutional Matters:**

**Budgetary, financial, and institutional matters:** Parties met in an SBI contact group co-chaired by Lenneke Ijzendoorn (Netherlands) and Zita Wilks (Gabon) on 12 and 14 November, among others. They agreed to take note of a report by the UN Board of Auditors ([FCCC/SBI/2024/INF.7](#) and [Add.1](#)) as well as the status of contributions and fees ([FCCC/SBI/2024/INF.11](#)), and the work programme of the Secretariat for the biennium 2024–2025 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/INF.9](#)).

**Final Outcomes:** The COP adopted decisions forwarded by SBI 60 and SBI 61 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.4](#) and [L.11](#)), which the CMA endorsed. The CMP adopted decisions forwarded by SBI 60 and SBI 61 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.5](#) and [FCCC/SBI/2024/L.10](#)). In their respective decisions, the COP and CMP, *inter alia*:

- express appreciation to parties that made contributions to the core budget in a timely manner;
- strongly urge parties that have not made contributions in full to the core budget for the current and/or previous bienniums to do so without further delay and express concern regarding the high level of outstanding contributions to the core budget for the current and previous bienniums;
- express concern about activities and events, such as the regional climate weeks, and implementation of tools, such as the virtual conference platform, that facilitate inclusive participation being cancelled due to the unpredictability in contributions to the trust fund for supplementary activities, while some elements of the Secretariat work programme were substantially increased;
- request the Secretariat to increase transparency regarding the reappropriation of portions of the core budget and of funding in the trust fund for supplementary activities;
- request the Secretariat to significantly improve the transparency of its budget management process, including by preparing quarterly reports on the extent to which the core and supplementary budgets are funded, starting in the first quarter of 2025 at the latest;
- encourage the Secretariat to enhance clarity on the nature of activities, whether mandated or not, in documents on the programme budget for the biennium 2026-2027 and request the Secretariat to consider the challenges it faces in implementing mandated activities in the programme budget for 2024-2025 when preparing the programme budget for 2026-2027; and
- urge the Secretariat to prioritize the delivery of mandated activities and outputs and to ensure the inclusive participation of developing country delegates in sessions of the governing and

subsidiary bodies as well as in mandated events and meetings of constituted bodies, and to provide information to parties on its efforts to do so.

#### **Closing Segment**

At the end of the closing plenary in the early hours of Sunday, 24 November, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell said the NCQG is an insurance policy for humanity, and as such only works “if premiums are paid in full and on time.” He stressed that the next round of NDCs must deliver on the promise to ramp up renewables and transition away from fossil fuels.

President Babayev highlighted achievements such as the NCQG, stressing it will turn billions into trillions over the next decade, and noted the need to underpin all action with robust transparency, recalling that BTRs are to be submitted by the end of 2024.

The EIG welcomed the NCQG, stressed that the path away from fossil fuels is the safest path for all, and lamented this COP could not progress on human rights, gender, and intergenerational equity.

The UMBRELLA GROUP stressed the NCQG will support an ambitious response to climate change in developing countries and expressed disappointment that the special circumstances of SIDS and LDCs are not reflected.

The AFRICAN GROUP stated the progress achieved is far from what Africa hoped for, noting that the NCQG came “too little, too late, and too ambiguous.” They highlighted that adaptation needs alone stand at USD 400 billion and called for finance to be aligned with needs, including on the implementation of NAPs. They welcomed decisions on Article 6, adding the outcomes will support projects on the ground, and noted lack of political will to advance just transition and disappointment over lack of decisions on the GST.

The ARAB GROUP welcomed the NCQG and Article 6 decisions. They reaffirmed principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, insisting that developed countries take the lead on mitigation. Recognizing various tracks toward just transition pathways, they called for respecting the multiplicity of national tracks in the NDCs.

AOSIS called for a higher level of ambition on finance, emphasizing the need to meet the 1.5°C goal. They expressed disappointment over lack of progress on the GST dialogue, stating that all outcomes should be implemented with a special focus on MoI. Regretting the low ambition MWP and backtracking on just transition, they welcomed the Article 6 decisions and the outcome of the ocean and climate change dialogue.

GRUPO SUR, speaking for Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay, welcomed the NCQG and Article 6. They called for accelerated progress before COP 30, noting that for a new set of NDCs to be collectively aligned with the 1.5°C, MoI should be delivered with more funds for adaptation allocated to SIDS and LDCs. They stressed that affirming human rights, including for women and girls in all their diversity, children, Indigenous peoples, and people with disabilities will help achieve poverty eradication, just transition, and sustainable development.

Saying climate change is an issue of rights and survival, the LDCs registered their profound disappointment with the NCQG, MWP, adaptation, and loss and damage outcomes. They were concerned that the group’s special circumstances were completely neglected across these and other issues.

AILAC stated there was a “partial conclusion” on MoI but not on mitigation or follow-up to the GST to strengthen a transition from fossil fuels. They called for mainstreaming human rights and characterized Article 6 outcomes as a balance.

BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA, INDIA, and CHINA emphasized the need to show solidarity and work on the basis of the Paris Agreement rather than backtracking, noting this is key to achieve mutually beneficial cooperation. They took note of the NCQG outcome, saying that developed countries' finance obligations should be further specified. CHINA reaffirmed its commitment to upholding international cooperation on climate change and to continue South-South cooperation.

CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK, DEMAND CLIMATE JUSTICE, WOMEN and GENDER, and TRADE UNIONS refused to make an official statement so as not to “contribute to this sham of a process” and warned against “bringing legitimacy to a system that has failed all of us.”

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS condemned the “unethical methods and outcomes” of this COP and rejected the “financial colonization” of loans and other mechanisms that perpetuate climate injustice.

YOUTH NGOs called the NCQG's quantum “a blatant insult,” and an “act of betrayal,” and called on all parties to “defund genocide.”

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY NGOs said the steps taken in Baku are not enough and encouraged discussions on the trade and climate nexus.

**Conclusion of the session:** The Secretariat reported an estimated EUR 3.8 million in additional funds are needed for the trust fund to implement activities mandated at this session. The COP, CMP, and CMA adopted their respective reports ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.1](#), [FCCC/KP/CMP/2024/L.2](#), [FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.2](#)). The COP, CMP, and CMA also adopted a decision ([FCCC/CP/2024/L.8–FCCC/KP/CMP/2024/L.4–FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/L.14](#)) entitled “Expression of gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the people of the city of Baku.”

President Babayev gavelled the meeting to a close at 5:31 am on Sunday, 24 November 2024.

## A Brief Analysis of the Baku Climate Change Conference

*“The carpet is a language, a traditional local language. Still, it turns out it can be used for speaking about modern global phenomena.” – Faig Ahmed, Azerbaijani artist*

The Paris Agreement was intended to be a rich tapestry of norms and instruments to combat climate change. The Baku outcome pulled the carpet out from under this carefully constructed artifact. Developing countries who expected support for their climate action left Baku with far less than needed. The developed and developing countries who hoped everyone would undertake the much needed energy transition in lock-step left disappointed. The tatters are already showing for a rug so new.

Countries wove lines from the Paris Agreement to the agreement in Dubai and leading into Baku. These threads together make up the Paris Agreement. Interlocking motifs of the Agreement set out how countries will act, provide support, report, and take stock of their efforts. Since 2020, countries individually submitted their revised nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and collectively completed the first Global Stocktake (GST). Thus, each country knits its way, in a nationally determined manner, and contributes to creating a collective patchwork commensurate with the scale of the climate crisis. Or that's the hope. In Baku, one of the last major pieces was due—a new collective quantified finance goal (NCQG)

to support developing countries' climate ambitions, including in their next NDCs.

For the second year in a row, the closing plenary became a forum for countries from all regions to vent their many and varied disappointments. Some were exasperated that a few parties held up progress. But, depending on which issue one looked at, and who was speaking, those “few” could be any range of countries. This brief analysis considers the package of decisions adopted—and not adopted—including the new finance goal, and on mitigation, carbon markets, adaptation, and gender. Baku exacerbated worries over the Paris Agreement's ability to raise ambition and remain relevant in an increasingly frayed multilateral landscape.

### *Crafted to Last*

A carpet can tell a story. Passed down from generation to generation, its pattern remains the same as when it was first woven, but it may be viewed differently. In Baku, countries looked at the Paris Agreement and, especially last year's GST, and saw different stories. For some, the ratchet-up mechanism of the Agreement—that the GST should inform subsequently more ambitious NDCs—meant following up on the energy transition package agreed to in Dubai. For others, it meant focusing squarely on finance, crafting Baku's legacy as the moment to raise promises of support to match developing countries' needs. As countries looked to one another to move first on energy or finance, the two issues twisted together in an unfortunate downward spiral.

While the two-year work programme on the NCQG was called “*ad hoc*,” it was intended to avoid the improvisational nature of the USD 100 billion goal announced in 2009. Back then, the number seemed to be plucked from the air. Delays in the delivery of the goal and the lack of clear accounting methodologies weakened trust; even in Baku, countries still debated whether or not developed countries crossed the 100 billion threshold. For the NCQG, countries held roundtables and reviewed expert reports that set the scale of need in the trillions. Despite the veneer of a practice-informed process, the Baku negotiations and outcome clarified what many knew: finance is deeply political. As such, many of the mistakes of 2009 were repeated.

Developed countries waited until the very last moment to finally put their proposed amount on the table. While the Group of 77 and China called for USD 1.3 trillion and subgroups tabled expectations for public finance from developed countries in the USD 440, 600, and 900 billion range, developed countries' text only featured a placeholder, as they tried to woo wealthier developing countries into the contributor base. Not only were China and the Gulf States (among others) uninterested, the US also re-elected Donald Trump, which could mean the US may again leave the Paris Agreement. Unlike in 2009, the EU largely stood alone in the final huddles and shouldered much of the ire as Cuba, India, Bolivia, Nigeria, and members of civil society called the final amount—USD 300 billion per year by 2035—an “insult” or “joke.”

The USD 300 billion will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including (undefined) “alternative sources.” Trying to cast the net wider, the decision encourages developing countries to contribute on a South-South basis, something many already increasingly do, but not through the Financial Mechanism and not with the same level of transparency as developed countries, which follow specific reporting guidelines.

It's not just about the quantum, but the deep inequities in the current system. Over two years of discussions, developing countries were clear on how the global financial and investment system



is failing them and climate action. The Standing Committee on Finance's biennial look at climate finance flows confirms that most finance (from all sources, including domestic and international spending) flows to East Asia, Northern and Western Europe, and North America, in that order. Public and private climate finance neglects the most climate-vulnerable, and instead is pumped into larger, faster-growing economies. The least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) temporarily walked out of Presidency consultations because their minimum allocation floors, USD 220 and 39 billion respectively, were erased from the Presidency's proposed text. In the multiple rounds of shuttle diplomacy, two negotiators observed that "several developing countries wanted to protect their slice of the pie, especially if it wasn't getting bigger." This came at the expense of solidarity with those who have the highest capacity constraints and are particularly vulnerable to climate impacts.

What one observer called "the missed opportunity to look at practical options like aviation levies or debt forgiveness" might not all be lost. The "Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T" that made its way into the decision in the late stages of the negotiations will consider grants, concessional and non-debt-creating instruments, and measures to create fiscal space. It is silent on other financial priorities that divert money from climate action, notably, the USD 7 trillion spent annually on fossil fuel subsidies. But this particular silence was not limited to finance.

Fossil fuels are largely missing from the decisions adopted in Baku. Any decision hinting at transitioning away from fossil fuels was deferred, notably the operationalization of the dialogue on the implementation of the GST outcomes, guidance on NDC features, and the just transition work programme. In each case, the final drafts barely whispered about fossil fuels. The GST dialogue text—which wasn't adopted—referred to the energy transition paragraph in last year's GST decision. That's all. A SIDS negotiator noted that she "was so upset in Dubai over the weak energy language" and "flooded" that she had to fight to keep it alive in Baku.

For the Arab Group and Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) discussions on mitigation and the GST's energy transition package represent attempts to pull and creatively re-weave threads of the Paris Agreement, considering the Agreement itself ascribes mitigation action entirely to the NDCs. They also considered that discussions on features of NDCs, for one example, run counter to each country finding its way to a low-carbon economy, especially with little finance available.

Others showcased a desire to do more multilaterally. In heads of delegation discussions on the GST dialogue, AOSIS, AILAC, the EU and others pointed squarely at mitigation as a gap in the follow-up to the GST. With the resulting draft decision not making a grand statement on fossil fuels and barely echoing Dubai's mitigation calls, they preferred to see no decision over this weak one—even though it means missing out on the opportunity to inform the preparation of NDCs that will guide countries' actions until 2035.

### ***Elaborating the Pattern***

Azerbaijani carpets are renowned for their geometric patterns and in Baku, countries continued to elaborate the various angles in the Paris Agreement. While finance and discussions on energy transition occupied much of the political attention, parties weaved in adaptation and the Article 6 carbon markets, among others. This aimed to follow up on unfinished work of the Paris Agreement and its rulebook. Gender issues also became entwined as a cross-cutting or tangential line, depending on who was asked.

Until recently, the Global Goal on Adaptation was the least developed of the Agreement's goals. Work to make it more tangible and guide progress has been difficult and slow. Parties took a significant step forward in Dubai when they agreed on targets, and Baku advanced discussions on the definition of indicators to measure progress toward those targets. Parties provided further guidance to the experts contributing to the indicator definition process and agreed to develop a "manageable" list of no more than 100 indicators, including, ultimately, for means of implementation.

In what many consider to be the second biggest breakthrough in Baku after the NCQG, parties finally concluded the negotiations needed to fully operationalize the carbon markets under the Paris Agreement. The Article 6.4 methodologies and removals requirements were adopted on the very first day, despite having been rejected twice before and parties also reached a breakthrough on Article 6.2. Using the Article 6.2 cooperative approaches and Article 6.4 mechanism, countries can now start recording, issuing, and trading carbon credits.

Even those with a critical eye toward carbon markets cited some positive transparency features, including publicizing inconsistencies in the information on the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, but they worried this could come too late for the potential deluge of demand from airlines using the International Civil Aviation Organization's offsetting scheme, which entered its first phase this year.

Importantly, the Article 6.2 decision will allow the Secretariat to provide registry services to countries that request it, allowing them to issue mitigation outcomes as units, and these services would be interoperable with the international registry. This means countries that may struggle to establish their national registries can still participate in the Article 6.2 cooperative approaches, ensuring that regions traditionally overlooked for such investments can participate in global carbon markets.

The first Article 6.4 issuances can roll out as early as 2025, thanks mostly to the adoption of the requirements. Most will likely be Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits transitioning over to the Article 6.4 mechanism. Despite attempts to add further checks that these CDM credits are "additional," no "additional additionality" scrutiny will take place. Some hoped that this meant the CDM "could finally die" because countries would be confident they could move their credits over to the Article 6.4 mechanism.

Adaptation and Article 6 are widely viewed as "core" climate themes that negotiators know how to deal with. Social equity has proven more difficult. Across a wide range of issues, from finance to adaptation, a small group of countries fought to equate Indigenous Peoples with local communities, which disregards their distinct rights under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Discussions on gender were even more fraught. The Arab Group and the Russian Federation argued against references to "gender-responsiveness" and, with the African Group, objected to terminology such as "gender diversity" and "intersectionality." It underscored parties' divide in knitting together human rights and climate change.

### ***Con-fiar***

Brazilian Minister of the Environment and Climate Change, Marina Silva, gave delegates a brief Portuguese lesson during the closing plenary: *confiar* (to trust) joins *com* (with) and *fio* (thread). As women in Azerbaijan have woven carpets for centuries, so too have their sisters in the Amazon, and while weaving they built community and, as Silva stressed, trust. Trust in the UN Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process has been scarce for years. But it is needed more than ever, to raise the necessary finance and enact climate policies that leave no one behind.

Trust will be needed to mend the carpets left bare in Baku. Headed to Belém in 2025, the task may be to salvage the legitimacy of the UN climate negotiations. With mounting questions about whether the Paris Agreement is fit for purpose, there is little time left to show its basic design can inspire countries to rise to the challenge of the climate crisis. Current NDCs will leave future generations with a 3°C warmer world. As UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell noted, this is better than where we were headed before the Paris Agreement, but it is far from a safe planet. New NDCs are due in February 2025. Many expect a few countries to meet this deadline and the rest to be announced closer to the Belém conference. Asking developing countries to strengthen the threads they have woven in the Paris Agreement in the form of more ambitious NDCs, with limited and unequally distributed support, will indeed require trust.

### Upcoming Meetings

**UNCCD COP 16:** The COP to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification will review global progress toward land degradation neutrality and confront pressing issues like enhancing drought resilience, promoting women's land rights, and combating sand and dust storms. **dates:** 2-13 December 2024 **location:** Riyadh, Saudi Arabia **www:** [unccd.int/cop16](https://unccd.int/cop16)

**International Court of Justice:** The International Court of Justice will hold hearings in the context of its advisory opinion on the obligations of states in relation to climate change. **dates:** 2-13 December 2025 **location:** The Hague, the Netherlands **www:** [icj-cij.org/case/187](https://icj-cij.org/case/187)

**68th Meeting of the GEF Council:** The GEF Council customarily meets twice annually but is meeting three times in 2024, the third time virtually in December. **dates:** 16-20 December 2024 **location:** virtual **www:** [thegef.org/events/68th-gef-council-meeting](https://thegef.org/events/68th-gef-council-meeting)

**62nd Session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change:** The meeting will be the fourth meeting of the seventh assessment cycle. **dates:** 24 February-1 March 2025 (TBC) **location:** TBC **www:** [ipcc.ch/](https://ipcc.ch/)

**69th Meeting of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council:** The Council develops, adopts, and evaluates the operational policies and programs for GEF-financed activities. The UNFCCC invited the GEF to consider a number of issues emerging from COP 29. **dates:** 2-5 June 2025 **location:** Washington, DC, US **www:** [thegef.org](https://thegef.org)

**Global NDC Conference 2025:** This conference will bring together policymakers and practitioners to share experiences on climate governance, finance, and transparency, with the aim of inspiring accelerated, transformational climate action around the world. **dates:** 11-13 June 2025 **location:** Berlin, Germany **www:** [globalndcconference.org](https://globalndcconference.org)

**62nd Sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SB 62):** The SBSTA and SBI will meet for their regular intersessional gatherings, taking up a range of issues including follow up from COP 29. **dates:** 16-26 June 2025 **location:** Bonn, Germany **www:** [unfccc.int](https://unfccc.int)

**2025 World Bank Group/International Monetary Fund (IMF) Annual Meeting:** The World Bank and IMF will take up various topics, including invitations from the UNFCCC to consider outcomes from COP 29. **dates:** 17-19 October 2025 **location:** Washington DC, US **www:** [worldbank.org/en/meetings/splash/about#sec1](https://worldbank.org/en/meetings/splash/about#sec1)

**UNFCCC COP 30:** The 30th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 30), the 20th meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 20), and the sixth meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 7). **dates:** 10-21 November 2025 **location:** Belém, Brazil **www:** [unfccc.int](https://unfccc.int)

For additional upcoming events, see [sdg.iisd.org](https://sdg.iisd.org)

### Glossary

AILAC	Independent Association for Latin America and the Caribbean
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
BTR	Biennial transparency report
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
COP	Conference of the Parties
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre and Network
EIG	Environmental Integrity Group
ETF	Enhanced Transparency Framework
GAP	Gender action plan
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GGA	Global goal on adaptation
GHG	Greenhouse gases
GST	Global Stocktake
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITMO	Internationally transferred mitigation outcome
KCI	Katowice Committee on Impacts
LCIPP	Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform
LDCs	Least developed countries
LEG	LDC Expert Group
LMDCs	Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries
MoI	Means of implementation
MWP	Mitigation ambition and implementation work programme
NAPs	National adaptation plans
NCQG	New collective quantified goal
NDCs	Nationally determined contributions
PCCB	Paris Committee on Capacity-building
SBs	Subsidiary Bodies
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCF	Standing Committee on Finance
SIDS	Small island developing states
TEC	Technology Executive Committee
TIP	Technology implementation programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism on loss and damage