BIODIVERSITY AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CAN THE TWO CO-EXIST?
Ashish Kothari
Kalpavriksh - Environment Action Group
1. Introduction
The last few years have seen a range of
significant developments related to intellectual property rights (IPRs) and biodiversity.
At least two major international agreements, both legally binding, deal with this issue:
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In addition,
the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and other international institutions
are increasingly becoming active on the subject.
At national levels, too, there is
considerable activity. Several countries (Costa Rica, Eritrea, Fiji, India, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines) are coming up with legislation, or other measures, which respond to the above
treaties or in other ways deal with the relationship between IPRs and biodiversity (Glowka
1998). Of particular interest to many countries, especially in the 'developing' world, are
the following:
Protecting indigenous knowledge
(traditional and modern) from being "pirated" and used in IPR claims by
industrial/commercial interests;
Regulating access to biological resources
so that historical "theft" of these resources by the more powerful sections of
the global society can be stopped, and communities/countries are able to gain control and
benefits from their use.
These issues relate not just to IPR regimes
but also to the new provisions of Access and Benefit-sharing which the CBD contains, and
which are being followed up by several countries with appropriate domestic legislation.
Propelling the spurt in activity on this
front are the IPR-related scandals that periodically shock the world, such as:
The patenting of ancient herbal remedies,
e.g. the US Patent (No. 5,401,504) given to the healing properties of turmeric, known for
centuries to Indians; or the US plant patent (No. 5,751) on the 'ayahuasca' plant,
considered sacred and used for medicinal purposes by Amazon's indigenous peoples;
The patenting of crop varieties which are
similar to those grown for centuries in certain geographical areas, e.g. for varieties of
Basmati rice by Rice-Tec Corporation in the US (Patent No. 5,663,484); Rice-Tec even uses
the term Basmati, long used to refer to aromatic rice grown in northern India and
Pakistan, to describe its rice varieties;
The patenting of human genetic material,
e.g. on the human cell line of a Hagahai tribesman from Papua New Guinea (US Patent No.
5,397,696)
Plant breeders' rights or patents on entire
taxa rather than specific varieties or breeds, e.g. on all transgenic cotton or soybean
granted to the company Agracetus; and
Patents on technologies that threaten
farming systems worldwide, such as US Patent No. 5,723,765 granted to Delta and Pine Land
Co., nick-named the Terminator Technology for its potential of stopping plant regeneration
after the first generation.
All countries are now required to respond
to this issue, especially given the following specific decisions taken at international
forums:
Decisions (II/12, III/17, and IV/15) at
successive Conferences of the Parties to the CBD, asking for more in-depth understanding,
case studies, and other follow-up on the relationship between IPRs and biodiversity in
general, and TRIPs and CBD in particular;
The upcoming review of the relevant clause
(27(3b) of the TRIPs agreement, in late 1999 or early 2000;
Decisions (III/17 and IV/9) at the
Conferences of Parties to the CBD, and at other forums, to work towards the protection of
indigenous and local community knowledge, if need be through alternative IPR regimes.
This article attempts to do the following:
Give a brief history of IPRs related to
biodiversity;
Explore the precise relationship between
IPRs and biodiversity;
Point out the contradictions between TRIPs
and the CBD;
Examine the spaces available in existing
regimes for appropriate national action; and
Point to possible alternative regimes and
actions which would help to resolve the conflicts between IPRs and biodiversity.
2. A Brief History of IPRs and Biodiversity
IPRs, as the term suggests, are meant to be
rights to ideas and information, which are used in new inventions or processes. These
rights enable the holder to exclude imitators from marketing such inventions or processes
for a specified time; in exchange, the holder is required to disclose the formula or idea
behind the product/process. The effect of IPRs is therefore monopoly over commercial
exploitation of the idea/information, for a limited period. The stated purpose of IPRs is
to stimulate innovation, by offering higher monetary returns than the market otherwise
might provide.
While IPRs such as copyrights, patents, and
trademarks are centuries old, the extension of IPRs to living beings and
knowledge/technologies related to them is relatively recent. In 1930, the U.S. Plant
Patent Act was passed, which gave IPRs to asexually reproduced plant varieties. Several
other countries subsequently extended such or other forms of protection to plant
varieties, until in 1961, an International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties
of Plants was signed. Most signatories were industrialised countries, who had also formed
a Union for the Portection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). This treaty came into force
in 1968.
Plant varieties or breeders' rights
(PVRs/PBRs), give the right-holder limited regulatory powers over the marketing of 'their'
varieties. Till recently, most countries allowed farmers and other breeders to be exempted
from the provisions of such rights, as long as they did not indulge in branded commercial
transactions of the varieties. Now, however, after an amendment in 1991, UPOV itself has
tightened the monopolistic nature of PVRs/PBRs, and some countries have substantially
removed the exemptions to farmers and breeders.
In addition, in many countries, patents
with full monopolistic restrictions are now applicable to plant varieties,
micro-organisms, and genetically modified animals. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that microbiologist Ananda Chakrabarty's patent claim for a genetically engineered
bacterial strain, was permissible. This legitimised the view that anything made by humans
and not found in nature was patentable. Genetically altered animals, such as the infamous
'onco-mouse' of Harvard University (bred for cancer research), were also soon given
patents. Finally, several patent claims have been made, and some granted, on human genetic
material, including on material that has hardly been altered from its natural state.
Till very recently, these trends were
restricted to some countries, which could not impose them on others. However, with the
signing of the TRIPs agreement, this has changed. TRIPs requires that all signatory
countries accept:
Patenting of micro-organisms and
"microbiological processes"; and
Some "effective" form of IPRs on
plant varieties, either patents or some sui generis (new) version.
TRIPs allows countries to exclude animals
and plants per se from patentability. However, the provisions above have serious
enough implications, for no longer are countries allowed to exclude patenting of life
forms altogether (micro-organisms have to be open for patenting). Nor is there likely to
be a great amount of flexibility in evolving sui generis systems of plant variety
protection, for the term "effective" may well be interpreted by industrial
countries to mean a UPOV-like model. Indeed, a series of events in 1999, such as meetings
in Africa (February 1999) and Asia (March 1999) hosted by UPOV, WTO or other agencies,
have shown that this interpretation is already being imposed on 'developing' countries.
The African Intellectual Property Organisation (OAPI), representing 15 Francophone
countries, has decided to join UPOV 1991.
The history of IPRs shows that the
monopolistic hold of governments, corporations and some individuals over biological
resources and related knowledge is continuously increasing. As the examples noted in the
Introduction shows, a substantial amount of this monopolisation is built upon, and through
the appropriation of, the resources conserved and knowledge generated by indigenous and
local communities.
3. IPRs vs. Biodiversity
The CBD has two interesting provisions
relating to IPRs. One (Article 16.5) states that Contracting Parties shall cooperate to
ensure that IPRs are "supportive of and do not run counter to its (the CBD's)
objectives". However, this is "subject to national legislation and international
law". Another (Article 22) states that the CBD's provisions will not affect rights
and obligations of countries to other "existing international agreements, except
where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat
to biological diversity". Read together and in the spirit of the CBD, many people
have said there is a basis for countering the runaway march of the IPR regimes described
above.
But in order for this argument to hold, the
actual impacts of IPRs on biodiversity need to be examined. This is a difficult subject,
for direct impacts are hard to perceive. However, the following aspects must be considered
(Kothari and Anuradha 1997):
Current IPR regimes have allowed industrial
and commercial interests to appropriate the resources and knowledge of resource-rich but
economically poor countries and communities, further 'impoverishing' them or excluding
them from technological improvements;
IPRs are likely to greatly intensify the
trend to homogenise agricultural production and medicinal plant use systems. In
agriculture, for instance, any corporation which has spent enormous amounts of money
obtaining an IPR, would want to push its varieties in as large an area as possible. The
result would be serious displacement of local diversity of crops (though of course IPRs
would not be the only factor in this);
Increasingly species-wide IPRs (such as
those on transgenic cotton and soybean) could stifle even public sector and small-scale
private sector crop variety development;
Having to pay substantial royalties to
industrial countries and corporations could greatly increase the debt burdens of many
countries. This could further intensify the environmental and social disruption that is
caused when debt repayment measures are taken up, such as the export of natural products;
Farmers who innovate on seeds through
re-use, exchange with other farmers, and other means, would be increasingly discouraged
from doing so if the tighter regimes that UPOV 1991 sanctifies are imposed on their
countries; these regimes would also increase the economic burden on farmers, further
discouraging innovation;
The ethical aspects of IPRs are
serious, and to many communities and people the most important reasons for opposing
current IPR regimes : the patenting of life forms (abhorrent to many traditional
societies and modern conservationists because of its assumption that nature exists apart
from, and for the interest of, humans); the privatisation of knowledge (repugnant to many
societies which held knowledge to largely, though by no means only, in the public domain);
and others.
4. TRIPs vs. CBD
The TRIPs agreement is only likely to
greatly intensify the impacts outlined above. In particular, its attempt to homogenise IPR
regimes militates against a country's or community's freedom to choose the way in which it
wants to deal with the use and protection of knowledge. Equally important, it contains no
provision for the protection of indigenous and local community knowledge. Such knowledge,
because of its nature, may not be amenable to protection under current IPR regimes.
Finally, it has no recognition of the need to equitably share in the benefits of knowledge
related to biodiversity. Indeed, it legitimises the conventional inequities that have
characterised the interactions between the industrial-commercial use of
biodiversity-related knowledge, and the community/citizen use of such knowledge.
The negative impacts of TRIPs on the three
objectives of the CBD are already beginning to be felt, or threatened, in some countries
(see national reviews by Dhar 1999 and Anuradha 1999; see also box below). There is an
urgent need to explore whatever spaces are available within existing regimes, to counter
these threats, and to examine alternative regimes which have conservation, sustainable
use, and equitable benefit-sharing built into them.
TRIPs vs. CBD in India
India is currently considering two laws to
follow up TRIPs and CBD: the Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Bill (PVFRB) and the
Biological Diversity Act (BDA), respectively. The PVFRB is supposed to be India's sui
generis plant variety protection regime (as per Article 27(3)b of TRIPs). However, in
several ways these two are not in harmony:
Whereas the BDA provides for the protection
of local community rights in a broad sense, the PVFRB contains only a narrow definition of
farmers' rights (the right to reuse, exchange, and sell (except as branded product)
protected plant varieties; it does not provide for the protection of farmers' own
varieties (which are unlikely to pass the stringent tests of novelty, distinctiveness,
etc.) but rather focuses on benefiting formal sector plant breeders;
Whereas the BDA explicitly provides for
benefit-sharing measures with local communities, the PVRFB has no such provision;
Whereas the BDA attempts to include local
community representatives at various levels of decision-making, the PVRFB almost
completely excludes them, giving decision-making powers largely to bureaucracies;
Whereas the BDA requires impact assessments
to ensure that all developmental activities are in harmony with biodiversity conservation
and sustainable use, the PVRFB does not require any such assessments for plant variety
protection applications;
The contradictions between the two proposed
laws are yet to be resolved, though they have been pointed out by NGOs and activists
(Kothari 1999).
Interestingly, India is not even required
to go in immediately for a plant variety protection law; the haste with which the PVFRB
has been drafted, points to the influence of the increasingly powerful seed industry
(domestic and foreign).
5. Space within Existing Regimes
Space within TRIPs : Though
essentially favouring the further expansion of current IPR regimes, there are some
provisions in TRIPs that can be exploited by communities and countries interested in
protecting their interests against those of dominant industrial-commercial forces:
Article 8 allows for legal measures to
protect public health/nutrition, and public interest; though environmental protection is
not explicitly built into this, it could be justified as being in "public
interest". Unfortunately, this clause is subject to "the provisions of
TRIPs", which leaves wide open the interpretation of its applicability;
Article 27(2) allows for exclusion, from
patentability, inventions whose commercial use needs to be prevented to safeguard against
"serious prejudice" to the environment. This is somewhat convoluted, because a
country will first need to determine such serious prejudice, justify the prevention of
commercial use, and then only be able to justify non-granting of patents;
Article 27(3) allows countries to exclude
plants and animals from patentability, and also plant varieties, so long as there is some
other "effective" form of IPR to such varieties. As mentioned above, what is
"effective" is likely to be determined by powerful countries, in which case the
almost patent-like regime being advocated by UPOV could well be pushed. However, an
exceptionally bold country could well experiment with completely different sui generis systems
(see alternatives, below), and face up to any charges that are brought against it at WTO.
Article 22 allows for the protection of
products which are geographically defined through "geographical indications".
This could help protect some products which are known by the specific locations in which
they have originated (as has been done, for instance, with champagne). It is debatable
whether, for instance, Basmati rice could have been protected in this manner (the name
does not derive from any location, but the variety is known to come from a particular
geographical area). Countries like India are already considering domestic legislation on
this.
Space within CBD: As mentioned
above, both Article 16(5) and Article 22 provide countries with some maneuverability with
regard to IPRs. If indeed a country can establish that IPRs run counter to conservation,
sustainable use, and/or equitable benefit-sharing, it should be justified in excluding
such IPRs. However, the caveat "subject to national legislation and international
law" may well make this difficult, since TRIPs is also "international law".
Between TRIPs and the CBD, which holds legal priority? Legal opinion would perhaps be that
TRIPs, being the later treaty, would supercede CBD in case of a conflict. However, given
that CBD deals much more with the protection of public interest and morality, which TRIPs
acknowledges as valid grounds for any measures that countries want to take, it could be
argued that CBD's provisions should supercede those of TRIPs. This interface has not yet
been tested in any active case in the international arena; only when it does, will we know
what intrepretation is likely to hold. The CBD, unfortunately, is at a serious
disadvantage as it does not yet have a dispute resolution mechanism of its own, unlike the
WTO.
Perhaps the most crucial provision within
CBD may be Article 8j, which requires countries to respect and protect indigenous and
local community knowledge, ensure that such communities are asked before using their
knowledge for wider society, and further ensure the equitable sharing of benefits arising
from such use. Built into this provision are the seeds of a radically different vision of
protecting knowledge and generating and sharing benefits from it. Discussions within the
CBD forums, including at successive Conferences of Parties, have demonstrated this
potential, especially since a wide range of indigenous and local community groups have
used the forums to push their case.
In this connection, an interesting question
would be: can a country challenge another country's IPR regime on the ground that it
fails to give adequate protection to informal innovations of indigenous or local
communities, and therefore violates Article 8j of the CBD? Can India challenge the
US patent regime as a whole, citing examples such as the turmeric patent? The Indian
delegation to WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment posed this question in a June 1995
meeting, but reportedly got no specific response. It would be interesting to see how the
CBD forums would deal with a charge like this, if brought by one country against another.
Changing IPR Regimes: A combination
of the relevant clauses in TRIPs and the CBD, can be used to argue for modifications in
existing IPR regimes which can help to safeguard public interest. Many people have argued,
for instance, that apart from the usual criteria of novelty, etc. that are required of an
IPR applicant, the following should also be sought as part of the application:
Source (country/community/person) of the
material or information that has gone into the produce/process for which an IPR is
claimed;
Proof of prior informed consent from the
country and community of origin (as per Articles 15(5) and 8j of the CBD);
Details of the benefit-sharing arrangements
entered into with the community of origin, wherever applicable (as per Article 8j of the
CBD).
Countries like India have also suggested
that all IPR applications, which are related to biodiversity and biodiversity-related
knowledge, should be posted on the Clearing House Mechanism (set up under the CBD), giving
concerned countries and communities/persons an opportunity to object if they feel that
their rights have been violated. These suggestions have, of course, not yet been accepted
at an international level, but are being built into some domestic legislation.
Other Spaces: Some other forms of
IPRs could be used for protecting indigenous and local community knowledge. These include
copyright, and know-how licences (see, for instance, the use of such licences in the case
of the Aguaruna people of Peru, Tobin 1997). In addition, a number of other international
treaties (though not legally binding) could well be used for countering the threat of
current IPR regimes. These include the FAO Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, the ILO
Convention 169 on indigenous peoples, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the UNESCO/WIPO Model Provisions for National Laws on Protection of
Expressions of Folklore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and others (for a useful review, see
Posey 1996).
Perhaps what is most important is to push
the precautionary principle at all international levels. Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration provides that, "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost effective measures to prevent environmental degradation". The Preamble to the
CBD also recognises this, in similar words. No serious thought has, however, yet gone into
what this could mean under the CBD. What it requires is determination of whether IPRs,
even in theory, pose significant threats or not. From the discussion above, it would
appear that they do. In any case, countries and communities could assert that those who
want to impose IPR regimes of a certain nature, should be burdened with proving that they
do not pose such threats.
6. Alternative regimes
Given the extreme uncertainties about how
far the spaces within existing IPR/trade regimes can be stretched, there is a clear need
for alternative regimes and measures that safeguard the interests of conservation,
sustainable use, and equity in the use of biodiversity. These could include:
Community-based IPR and resource rights
regimes: A number of NGOs and individuals have advocated various forms of
intellectual rights regimes which recognise the essentially community-based nature of a
lot of biodiversity-related knowledge. At an international level, for instance, an
alternative to UPOV has been suggested by Indian NGOs Gene Campaign (1998); this proposed
regime gives focuses equally on farmers' and breeders' rights. At national level, groups
like the Third World Network, GRAIN, and the Research Foundation for Science, Technology
and Ecology, have advocated Community IPR regimes (Nijar 1996; GRAIN 1995; Shiva et.al.
1997); Posey and Dutfield (1996) have argued for a system of Traditional Resource Rights
which encompass not just intellectual but also physical resource and cultural rights.
Countries like the Philippines are attempting to try such regimes, though the experience
is far too short to make any judgements of their efficacy.
In addition, WIPO and other international
agencies are also studying the possibilities of protecting indigenous and local community
knowledge through alternative regimes.
Defensive IPRs: An idea worth
pursuing is a regime of essentially 'defensive' rights. Such a regime would not allow the
right holder to monopolise knowledge or its use, but would guarantee him/her the ability
to stop others from appropriating or misusing their knowledge or resources. In other
words, no-one would be able to monopolise any resource or knowledge over which such a
right has been granted. A country could pass legislation stating that its resources were
accessible to all, provided they signed a legally binding agreement that they would not in
any way apply restrictive IPRs on these resources, or allow such application by third
parties. In addition, appropriate benefit-sharing arrangements could also be worked out in
Material or Information Transfer Agreements. Of course, for a country to introduce such a
system on its own would not make much sense; this would have to be pushed as an acceptable
regime at an international level.
There would then be a valid question: what
incentives for innovation would such a regime provide? This is dealt with in the Section 7
below.
Civil society resistance and challenges to
dominant IPR regimes: One final strategy for countering the inequitable and
destructive trend of current IPR regimes, is the mobilisation of civil society to resist
and challenge them. In a number of countries, notably Thailand and India, farmers' groups,
NGOs, and scientists have led the struggle against the "piracy" of indigenous
and local community knowledge, and the imposition of IPRs on life forms and related
knowledge. Legal challenges have been taken to the U.S. and European patent offices (e.g.
in the case of turmeric, by the Indian government; in the case of neem tree products, by
several NGOs; and in the case of the and sacred "ayahuasca" plant, by a
combination of North and South American groups). Farmers in many countries have warned
corporations and governments not to bring in IPRs on crop varieties, and have decided to
openly violate any such IPRs even if it means being jailed. Indigenous peoples everywhere
are acquiring a deeper understanding of IPR regimes, and ways of challenging them when
they impinge on their human or resource rights. Though not of the same nature, the Dutch
challenge to the recent European Directive on Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions (which attempts to make patents on life forms uniformly possible in Europe), is
also noteworthy.
Another form of resistance is the revival
of farming and medicinal systems that allow communities and citizens to be largely
self-reliant. This would reduce the dependence on corporate and State-controlled seeds and
drugs, amongst other things, and therefore escape the IPR trap altogether. Of course,
given existing economic and social structures, and the increasing incursion of the global
economy into the everyday lives of even 'remote' communities, this form of resistance is
getting more difficult. But there are significant movements that have kept alive its
possibilities, e.g. the widespread revival of agro-biodiverse farming systems in India and
other parts of South and South-east Asia.
7. Who Will Provide the Incentives for
Innovation?
One question that is frequently posed to
those opposing the global imposition of current IPR regimes is: how will incentives for
continuous innovation be provided if IPRs are not provided? This question assumes that the
monetary benefits derived from IPRs (by monopolising the market for a period) are the
only, or major incentive for innovation. This assumption has not been proven over a long
term and in a wide variety of circumstances; a recent study evaluating 65 years of the
U.S. Plant Patents Act concluded that the Act has neither helped breeding as a profession
nor stimulated species, genetic, or even market diversification (RAFI 1995).
For the majority of humanity's existence of
earth, innovation has been born of motives other than personal monetary profit: sheer
survival, goodwill, social recognition, even power. The fact that Asian farmers could
develop, out of one species of rice, hundreds of thousands of varieties to suit a
diversity of ecological and social situations, is proof of this. Public sector crop
breeding in a number of countries has progressed enormously on the motivation of public
welfare. Though by no means universal, the spirit of public welfare and sharing that
motivates traditional healers, farmers, and others, is still very much alive in many
countries. Detailed studies of community involvement in biodiversity conservation and
sustainable use have, indeed, shown that more than money, tenurial security, social
recognition and rewards, and other non-monetised incentives are what drives such
involvement. To displace this spirit by forcing upon countries and communities a
uni-dimensional view of innovation, which is based on the profit motive alone, is to do a
grave injustice to humanity.
8. What is the Way Forward?
The arguments made above lead to the
following steps, which communities and countries could consider:
Pushing for the use of the maximum space
allowed in existing IPR regimes, including by widening the definitions of "public
interest" to its logical limits, attempting bold sui generis systems of plant
variety protection, advocating the use of the precautionary principle in all trade and
other transactions, etc.
Advocating that, in the upcoming review of
Article 27.3(b) of TRIPs, maximum flexibility be built in, allowing countries the option
of fully excluding life forms from patents, and the possibility of developing sui
generis systems of plant variety protection which are "effective" from a
national or community point of view;
Studying, in-depth, the relationship
between IPRs and biodiversity (and biodiversity-related knowledge), and providing to
international forums the results of these studies;
Challenging, at international forums,
countries and corporations that are known to be violating Article 8j and other relevant
provisions of the CBD; and using Article 16(5) and 22 of the CBD to the maximum extent
possible;
Developing an international agreement (or
protocol under the CBD) on the protection of indigenous and local community knowledge, and
related access/benefit-sharing measures;
Steering the revision of the FAO
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, the WIPO initiative on "new
beneficiaries", and other processes (including proposed ones like the Database
Treaty) into directions which ensure conservation, sustainable use, and equity in
benefit-sharing;
Developing and implementing domestic
legislation which protects the interests of biodiversity conservation and local community
livelihood security.
Some of these steps were also advocated at
a recent international Workshop on Biodiversity Conservation and Intellectual Property
Rights, organised by the Research and Information System on Non-aligned and Developing
Countries (RIS), and Kalpavriksh - Environmental Action Group, under the sponsorship of
IUCN - The World Conservation Union. While largely arising from the experiences of South
Asian countries, the recommendations of this workshop have much wider validity. The
recommendations relating to international processes are therefore reproduced as an
attachment to this article.
References and Bibliography
Anuradha, R.V. 1999. Between the CBD
and the TRIPs: IPRs and What It Means for Local and Indigenous Communities. Paper
presented at Workshop on Biodiversity Conservation and Intellectual Property Regime,
RIS/Kalpavriksh/IUCN, New Delhi, 29-31 January, 1999. Draft.
Dhar, B. and Chaturvedi, S. 1999.
Implications of the Regime of Intellectual Property Protection for Biodiversity: A
Developing Country Perspective. Paper presented at Workshop on Biodiversity Conservation
and Intellectual Property Regime, RIS/Kalpavriksh/IUCN, New Delhi, 29-31 January, 1999.
Draft.
Dutfield, G. 1998. Background Paper on
Intellectual Property Rights in the Context of Seeds and Plant Varieties. IUCN Project on
the Convention on Biological Diversity and the International Trade Regime. Draft.
Gene Campaign. 1998. Convention of
Farmers and Breeders: A Forum for Implementing Farmers and Breeders Rights in Developing
Countries. A Draft Treaty Presented as an Alternative to UPOV. New Delhi.
Glowka, L. 1998. A Guide to Designing
Legal Frameworks to Determine Access to Genetic Resources. IUCN - World Conservation
Union, Gland, Switzerland.
GRAIN. 1995. Towards a Biodiversity
Community Rights Regime. Seedling 12(3): 2-14, October.
Kothari, A. 1999. Intellectual Property
Rights And Biodiversity: Are Indias Proposed Biodiversity Act And Plant Varieties
Act Compatible? Paper presented at Workshop on Biodiversity Conservation and Intellectual
Property Regime, RIS/Kalpavriksh/IUCN, New Delhi, 29-31 January, 1999.
Kothari, A. and Anuradha, R.V. 1997. Biodiversity,
Intellectual Property Rights, and the GATT Agreement: How to Address the Conflicts?
Economic and Political Weekly, XXXII(43): 2814-2820, October 1997. Also in Biopolicy,
Vol2, Paper 4, PY97004, 1997, Online Journal, URL: http//www.bdt.org.br/bioline/py.
Nijar, G.S. 1996. In Defence of
Indigenous Knowledge and Biodiversity: A Conceptual Framework and Essential Elements of a
Rights Regime. Third World Network, Penang.
Posey, D.A. 1996. Traditional Resource
Rights: International Instruments for Protection and Compensation for Indigenous Peoples
and Local Communities. IUCN - The World Conservation Union, Gland.
Posey, D.A. and Dutfield, G. 1996. Beyond
Intellectual Property: Towards Traditional Resource Rights for Indigenous Peoples and
Local Communities. International Development Research Centre, Ottawa.
Shiva, V., Jafri, A.H., Bedi, G., and
Holla-Bhar, R. 1997. The Enclosure and Recovery of the Commons. Research Foundation
for Science, Technology and Ecology, New Delhi.
Tobin, B. 1997. Know-how Licences:
Recognising Indigenous Rights Over Collective Knowledge. Bulletin of the Working Group
on Traditional Resource Rights, Winter 1997.
WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY
CONSERVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
New Delhi, 29-31 January,
1999
Organised by Research and
Information System for Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries, Kalpavriksh, and IUCN -
The World Conservation Union
STATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
PREAMBULAR STATEMENT
A Workshop on Biodiversity
Conservation and Intellectual Property Rights was organised in New Delhi, on 29-31 January
1999, by the Research and Information System on Non-Aligned and Developing Countries
(RIS), Kalpavriksh, and IUCN - The World Conservation Union. More than 60 academics,
activists, researchers, NGO representatives, government officials, and representatives of
industry from India, together with a number of participants from other South Asian
countries, Europe and the USA, participated in the Workshop.
The major issue that was
deliberated upon in the Workshop was the conflicts and complementarities between the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) on the one hand, and the elements of the
international intellectual property regime, underlined by the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),
on the other. The participants identified specific action points that are required to be
taken up in the multilateral forums of CBD or WTO, and in the national context within
India and other developing countries, that would further the objectives of the CBD through
full use of spaces within existing IPR regimes, through further development and adaptation
of these using the review process in-built in the Agreement on TRIPs or, where necessary,
through creation of new regimes.
The statement and
recommended actions below are intended to reflect the range of views expressed at the
workshop and to offer a sense of the meeting.
There was strong support
for the three objectives of the CBD: conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use
of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from such
use. In addition, participants also recognised the immense contribution of traditional
knowledge and practices of local and indigenous communities for conservation, and
re-affirmed the need for the effective maintenance of such knowledge systems. In relation
to the TRIPs Agreement, participants recognised that the objectives of the Agreement,
i.e., the protection of IPRs, should provide benefits to both producers and users of
technological knowledge in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare in reality.
However, concern was expressed that the current IPR regimes, in particular the Agreement
on TRIPs, fail to adequately address a number of concerns central to the achievement of
the objectives of the CBD. They appear to pose a significant threat to conservation of
biodiversity, they do not address a range of equity issues including intergenerational
equity, and they render difficult both access to genetic resources and the fair sharing of
benefits arising from their use. Perhaps more seriously they fail to recognise and protect
traditional systems of knowledge that are needed to meet the objectives of the CBD fully,
especially the local and community knowledge and the knowledge systems of indigenous
peoples. There is therefore a need to achieve necessary amendments to existing regimes,
and/or develop alternative regimes to address these concerns.
The workshop identified the
following actions as steps to address some of these concerns:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
1. Recommendations Relating
to International Regimes
Current international
regimes which have relevance to IPR and biodiversity issues need to be substantially
reviewed, and attempts made both to use the spaces available within them and create new
spaces and alternative regimes which can help to conserve biodiversity and protect the
rights of indigenous and local communities. In particular, actions are needed in the World
Trade Organization (WTO), concerning specifically the Agreement on (TRIPs), the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the other relevant international processes, including
those that have been initiated by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
Besides, the search for alternative international regimes is also important.
A. WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION (SPECIFICALLY, TRIPs)
At the level of the WTO,
and specifically the TRIPs agreement, the following actions should be taken:
An open and transparent
process, involving civil society, of reviewing article 27.3(b) in 1999 and the review in
2000 of the TRIPs Agreement overall;
A full consideration of the
relevant provisions of the CBD, the FAO Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, the ILO
Convention 169, the UNESCO/WIPO Guidelines for Protection of Folklore, the UN Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, international human rights declarations,
and other relevant international treaties and processes, while undertaking the
above-mentioned reviews;
An independent and
transparent assessment of the environmental and equity implications of WTO in general and
TRIPs in particular, with the involvement of civil society and of relevant international
bodies relating to the CBD, the FAO and WIPO, and taking in particular the
"precautionary principle" enshrined in Agenda 21;
A review of Article 31 of
TRIPs to ensure its conformity with the preamble, and articles 7 and 8 of TRIPs, as well
as article 16 of the CBD. The aspects of authorisation for commercial and non-commercial
activity under Article 31 should be clarified during such review;
Expansion of, or at the
very least maintenance of, the exceptions in Article 27.3(b) of TRIPs, for patenting of
life forms; the expansion should ideally exclude micro-organisms, products and processes
thereof, from patentability;
The definition of the term
'micro-organism' should not be expanded to cover tissues, cells or cell lines or DNA
obtained from higher organisms, including human beings;
Expansion or at the very
least maintenance of the sui generis clause relating to plant variety protection, in order
to:
ensure implementation of
article 8(j) of the CBD relating to indigenous and local communities;
ensure that full
consideration of environmental and ethical concerns about IPRs on life forms are
addressed; and
allow the completion of a
biosafety protocol that establishes minimum international standards for the environmental
safety of releases of genetically modified organisms.
Amending the provisions of
Article 27.3(b) by either deleting the term "effective" in the context of sui
generis systems of plant variety protection, or defining it such that national priority is
paramount in the interpretation of the term, including the following:
Conservation and
sustainable use of biodiversity;
Promotion of traditional
lifestyles;
Promotion of food security
and health security;
Ensuring equitable benefit
sharing;
Invoking the precautionary
principle;
Respect of the principles
of equity and ethics;
Exploring ways of
interpreting and implementing TRIPs that help achieve the objectives of the CBD;
Measures to prevent the
unilateral pressure by some members to coerce other members to strengthen IPR regimes
beyond the TRIPs requirements;
Enhancing the scope of
Article 23 of TRIPs to strengthen protection of geographical indications for goods other
than wine and spirits, such as Darjeeling tea;
The scope of Article 22 of
the TRIPs should be expanded to protect denominations relating to geographic origin, and
characteristics associated with a specific region;
Inclusion of requirements
(in Article 29 of TRIPs) for disclosure of the genetic resources and the traditional
knowledge used in inventions for which IPRs are claimed, the country and community of
origin of these resources and knowledge, and proof of consent having been sought of the
relevant community and equitable benefit-sharing arrangements having been entered into
with them, as required by the CBD;
Steps to ensure that TRIPs
implementation and elaboration fulfils all the objectives stated in Article 7. This should
include striking a balance between rights and obligations, a balance that should take into
account the objectives of the CBD as well as the principles enunciated at the Earth
Summit;
B. CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (CBD)
The CBD process should take
the following measures:
Assess the relationship of
IPRs to access and benefit-sharing provisions, including in the development of guidelines
or best practices for achieving equitable benefit-sharing from use of genetic resources.
In particular, there should be consideration of mechanisms such as certificates of origin,
evidence of prior consent for access to genetic resource, evidence of prior approval of
indigenous and local communities for access to traditional knowledge, and disclosure of
this evidence in patent applications;
Evaluation of the impacts
of international processes relating to IPRs, including TRIPs, on the objectives of Article
8(j) of the CBD;
Development of a protocol
on the protection of indigenous and local community knowledge and resource rights;
Providing inputs into the
ongoing WIPO processes on "new beneficiaries" which are assessing issues
relating to protection of traditional knowledge; and
Development of a code of
conduct, or a protocol, on access and benefit-sharing, especially in relation to the
resources and knowledge of indigenous and local communities, and of developing
countries;
These steps could be taken
up as concrete points for the inter-sessional process relating to the implementation of
Article 8(j), which the CBD COP4 initiated; and of other processes relating to the
Biosafety Protocol and the inter-sessional work on access and benefit-sharing.
C. OTHER PROCESSES
Other international
processes relevant to IPRs and biodiversity need to take the following steps:
Development of the FAO
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, either in itself or as a protocol under the CBD,
should incorporate comprehensive protection of indigenous and local community knowledge,
along with provisions to conserve biodiversity and sustainably use biological resources;
Cooperation at the SAARC
level to jointly conserve biodiversity, achieve sustainable use, and promote equitable
benefit-sharing, especially through appropriate regional agreements;
Ensuring that any agreement
on databases (e.g. the proposed Database Treaty) ensures effective control by communities
of their knowledge, mechanisms that ensure effective and equitable sharing of benefits
with and within communities, and space for communities define the terms by which they
control access and require benefit-sharing;
At all international
forums, setting up of "intercultural panels" to evaluate the terms of
"cross-cultural transactions" by which knowledge relating to biodiversity from
one knowledge system is used in another system, including in dispute-resolution processes.
Ashish Kothari
Kalpavriksh - Environment Action Group
Aptmt. 5, Shree Dutta Krupa, 908 Deccan
Gymkhana, Pune 411004, India
Tel. and fax: 91-20-354239; E-mail: ashish@nda.vsnl.net.in
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